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NOTES
NEW CAPITAL MARKETS AND
SECURITIES REGULATIONS IN
HUNGARY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE INSIDER TRADING
REGULATIONS IN HUNGARY
AND THE UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
The explosion in insider trading regulation abroad during
the last decade has sparked renewed interest in the economic,
ethical, and legal bases and consequences of prohibiting securi-
ties trading on the basis of inside information.' There is an
"evolving consensus among the countries with important capi-
tal markets that trading on the basis of inside information
should be regulated."2 The prevailing policy is that insider
trading undermines the confidence of investors and the integri-
ty of the market and that such inefficient and unfair practices
should be prohibited.3 However, the worldwide outcry against
1. Donald C. Langevoort, Internationalization, Defining Insider Trading: The
Experience in Other Countries, INSIGHTS, July 1992, at 7; see also Ronald E.
Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 375, 376 (1978); Paul Blustein, Disputes Arise Over Value of
Laws on Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 28.
2. 10 SECURITIES LAW SERIES, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURI-
TIES REGULATION § 1.08[51[a], at 1-116.19 (Harold Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff
eds., 1993) [hereinafter Bloomenthal].
3. The widespread consensus supporting this basic philosophy is reflected in
the fact that the regulations recently enacted by many international entities reiter-
ate this fundamental premise. See infra note 5. See, e.g., Council Directive 89/592
of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, Intl Sec. Reg.
(Oceana), Booklet 2 [hereinafter EC Insider Dealing Directive]; Company Securities
(Insider Dealing) Act of 1985, 8 HALSBURY'S STAT. 750 (1991 Supp.) [hereinafter
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insider trading is also relatively new4 and has spawned di-
verse legislative and regulatory reactions.5
An ambitious effort to codify insider trading law has re-
cently been effected in Hungary. On January 25, 1990, the
Hungarian Parliament enacted Act VI of 1990 on Issuing and
Public Broking of Certain Securities and on Stock Exchange
(1990 Securities Act), which includes a "Restriction of Insider
Dealing."6 Additionally, as part of a comprehensive economic
UK Insider Dealing Act]; Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of April 13,
1948, art. 58 (amended 1992), Int'l Sec. Reg. (Oceana), Booklet 2 [hereinafter Ja-
pan Securities Exchange Law].
4. Until 1980 the United States and France were the only countries which
had comprehensively addressed the insider trading problem. However, during the
last decade, new laws have emerged in Europe, Canada, Latin America, and the
Pacific Rim countries. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 7.
5. While most countries now agree that trading or tipping on the basis of
inside information should be regulated, international approaches differ as to the
scope of persons prohibited and the range of prohibited activity. For example, the
definitions of primary insiders, those persons with direct and personal access to
inside information, vary considerably. The European Community's Insider Trading
Directive broadly defines primary insiders as members of the issuer, shareholders
of the issuer, and persons possessing inside information by virtue of the exercise
of their employment, profession, or duties, thereby including persons unrelated to
the issuer. EC Insider Dealing Directive, supra note 3, art. 2. The United
Kingdom's Company Securities Act defines primary insiders more restrictively, as
persons who are "knowingly connected" with an issuer, such as directors, officers,
employees, or other persons in positions involving a professional relationship in
which it would be reasonable to expect the person not to disclose the information,
thereby requiring an indirect link between the trader and the issuer. UK Insider
Dealing Act, supra note 3. The most conservative definition of primary insiders is
found in Japan's Securities Exchange Law, which defines them as corporate-related
parties associated with the issuer by employment, contract, or government supervi-
sion, thereby requiring a direct link between the trader and the issuer. Japan
Securities Exchange Law, supra note 3. See infra text accompanying notes 121-30,
143 for the scope of primary insiders in Hungary and the United States. Addition-
ally, while most countries extend the insider trading prohibition to recipients of
inside information, known as secondary insiders or tippees, they differ in their
scope of tippee liability. The European Community and Great Britain limit tippee
liability by requiring actual or constructive knowledge of the inside nature of the
information received on the part of the tippee. Japan further restricts the scope of
tippees by imposing liability only on tippees who receive inside information direct-
ly from the corporate-related party. See infra text accompanying notes 152-55, 163-
64 and note 123 respectively for the American and Hungarian definitions. Finally,
most countries prohibit the disclosing of inside information, but differ on the scope
of tippers. Great Britain broadly prohibits both primary and secondary insiders
from the act of tipping. The European Community less broadly bars primary, but
not secondary, insiders from tipping, except for disclosures made in the normal
course of the exercise of their employment, profession, or duties. Japanese law con-
tains no express anti-tipping ban. See infra part IV.C. and text accompanying
notes 156-58 for the United States and Hungarian renditions.
6. Act VI 1990 on Issuing and Public Broking of Certain Securities and on
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program to transform its Soviet-style command economy into a
Western-style market economy,7 Hungary formally reopened
the Budapest Stock Exchange on June 12, 1990, after a forty-
two-year hiatus.' In light of the tremendous political and eco-
nomic changes in Central and Eastern Europe in recent years
and Hungary's singular position as the most economically
advanced country in the region,9 the Hungarian market repre-
sents a unique opportunity for theorists to examine new securi-
ties regulations in the context of a fresh market. The economic
success of the Budapest Stock Exchange and the legal conse-
quences of the Hungarian securities regulations are of practi-
Stock Exchange, I No. 8 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force, at pt. VI [hereinafter
1990 Securities Act]. The 1990 Securities Act provides for the following: (1) the
State Stock Exchange Supervisory Board, which exercises exclusive jurisdiction
over capital markets; (2) the prospectus, which is required for all public offerings
other than those involving government securities, which must be approved by the
State Supervisory Board prior to the offering, and which must be published in two
nationally circulated newspapers and the official Stock Exchange Gazette; (3) the
annual financial reports and intermediate reports, which issuers are required to
publish and file with the Supervisory Board and furnish to shareholders, the latter
upon the occurrence of material changes which are reasonably expected to affect
investment decisions; (4) the approval by the Supervisory Board and the Hungari-
an National Bank of foreign listing of domestic companies and domestic offerings
of foreign companies; (5) the right of registered financial intermediaries to organize
stock exchanges as self-governing institutions empowered to issue their own regu-
lations, so long as they are within the broad parameters of the statute; (6) the
limited separation of commercial banking from investment banking, requiring
banks currently involved in securities activities to ultimately transfer their invest-
ment banking and brokerage activities to separate subsidiaries; (7) the capitaliza-
tion requirements for financial intermediaries to be set at $800,000 for dealers and
underwriters and at $80,000 for brokers, and the requirement for all market inter-
mediaries, including those wholly or partially owned by foreigners, to be organized
as Hungarian companies, and that those organized as joint stock companies to
issue registered shares; and (9) a transitional period of one to three years with
respect to separation of investment banking from commercial banking, adoption of
modern accounting standards, and delivery of requisite financial reports. Eastern
Europe: Emerging Stock Markets in Eastern Europe, EUROMONEY INT'L FIN. L.,
Nov. 3, 1990 [hereinafter Emerging Stock Markets].
7. See infra part II.
8. Peter Torday, Capitalism Returns to Hungary After 42 Years; Privatisation
Holds the Key to Success of the New Stock Market, INDEPENDENT, June 22, 1990,
at 21.
9. Hungary is the most advanced among the Central and Eastern European
countries in terms of the scope of its economic reforms. Specifically, its privatiza-
tion program is the most advanced and its stock exchange is the first in Central
and Eastern Europe. Mark D. Berniker, Hungarian Forint Closer to Full
Convertibility, J. CoM., Dec. 20, 1991, at 2A; Commentary: Danube Waters Un-
charted, INDEPENDENT, June 7, 1990, at 29. Hungary is situated in Central Eu-
rope, though many articles refer to the region as Eastern Europe.
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cal significance for emerging securities markets in the area
and of theoretical significance to market players and legal
analysts across the world.' °
This Note explores the meaning and effect of the insider
trading provisions in the Hungarian Securities Act by contrast-
ing them with comparable American legislation. Many of the
differences which will emerge reflect fundamental differences
in the economic and legal conditions in Hungary and the Unit-
ed States. Specifically, lawmaking under Hungary's civil code
system differs significantly from the United States' mix of
statutory and judicial lawmaking. Additionally, the former
socialist economy of Hungary is radically different from the
prosperous market economy of the United States. In order to
delineate the economic differences, Part II traces the economic
development of Hungary from the New Economic Mechanism
of 1968 to the reopening of the Budapest Stock Exchange in
1990.
Part III briefly discusses the basic elements of the insider
trading prohibitions in the United States and Hungary. Part
IV determines that the primary motivation behind the Hungar-
ian statute is a desire to conform with a growing international
consensus rather than a true concern with the economic ineffi-
ciency and ethical unfairness of insider trading. Part IV also
notes that the clarity and predictability of a statutory defini-
tion of insider trading is preferable to the vagueness and arbi-
trariness of a case-by-case definition. Part IV concludes that
because the scope of liabilitj under Hungarian law is not limit-
ed by the American requirement of a fiduciary duty, Hungary's
statutory scheme is broader and more rationally consistent
with traditional market efficiency and fairness rationales un-
derlying a policy against insider trading. Part V observes that
lenient criminal sanctions, exceptions to short-swing liability,
and nonaggressive institutional action will provide only weak
deterrence and ineffective enforcement of the statutory regula-
10. See Emerging Stock Markets, supra note 6 (noting that Eastern European
governments are adopting regulatory frameworks for securities markets and that it
is a "particularly appropriate time to review the emerging regulatory framework,
the present stages of development and the short-term future of the emerging capi-
tal markets in Eastern Europe"). But see Zsuzsa Ban, Taking Stock, HUNGARIAN
OBSERVER, Sept. 1990 (emphasizing that "[flor the time being, the new institution
[the Budapest Stock Exchange] has more theoretical significance than practical
utility").
1050 [Vol. XIX:3
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tions. Part VI concludes that regardless of the true intentions
behind the Hungarian reforms, Hungary must critically re-
examine the bases and merits of its statutory approach. Part
VII concludes by praising the Hungarians for an admirable
effort, but warning that the true effectiveness of Hungary's
enactment depends on its cohesive implementation," and
that the real success of its emerging capital markets depends
on their global adaptability. 2
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMY
A. Hungarian Economic Development,3
The economic transformation of Hungary from a command
to a market 'economy has been implemented in sporadic re-
forms by the Hungarian government. The economic history of
Hungary can be divided into three distinct phases: (1) the
period after the 1968 reforms; (2) the period after the 1978
reforms; and (3) the period after the recent reforms during the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Through economic deregulation
11. See Denise Hamilton, Hungary's Stock Market Has Same Woes as Capital-
ist Counterparts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1989, at 1 (noting that financial leaders in
Hungary realize that implementing laws is much more difficult than passing
them); OTTO HIERONYMI, ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR THE NEW HUNGARY: PROPOSALS
FOR A COHERENT APPROACH 65 (1990) (arguing that the reform attempts in Hun-
gary have been piecemeal and erratic); Danube Blues, ECONOMIST, May 28, 1988,
at 48 (concluding that reform in Hungary has suffered from a chasm between
rhetoric and reform).
12. The Hungarian securities market suffers from an inadequate supply of and
demand for securities. The dearth of promising and profitable businesses and ab-
sence of confident and willing investors indicates that foreign expertise and invest-
ment is needed. Sources of this problem include difficult currency convertibility,
intractable foreign debt, and unsophisticated technology. See, e.g., Gary
Humphreys, Privatisers Get Back on Track, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1991, at 45; Thomas
G. Donlan, Hungary for Stock-What's Up for Budapest's Bourse, BARRON'S, Feb. 5,
1990, at 46; Meat and Potatoes, J. COM., Mar. 6, 1989, at 8A; HIERONYMI, supra
note 11, at 67-68.
13. For a thorough history of Hungarian economic and legal reforms, see IVAN
T. BEREND, THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC REFORMS, 1953-1988 (1990); IVAN T.
BEREND & GYORGY RANKI, THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1985); HUNGARY: THE SECOND DECADE OF ECONOMIC REFORM, PERSPECTIVES ON
EASTERN EUROPE (Roger A. Clarke ed., 1989) [hereinafter Clarke]; MONEY INCEN-
TIVES AND EFFICIENCY IN THE HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC REFORM (Josef C. Brada &
Istvan Dobozi eds., 1990) [hereinafter Brada & Dobozi]; GABOR REVESZ,
PERESTROIKA IN EASTERN EUROPE, HUNGARY'S ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION, 1945-
1988 (1990); XAVIER RICHET, THE HUNGARIAN MODEL, MARKETS AND PLANNING IN
A SOCIALIST ECONOMY (J.C. Whitehouse trans., 1989).
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and liberalization, -Hungary has struggled to establish a new
type of social economy combining centrally planned regulation
with free market competition.' 4 While some commentators
have praised Hungary for its "unparalleled ... efforts to tran-
scend the basic structure of the traditional Soviet-type econom-
ic system," 5 others have criticized its "radically conceived but
modestly implemented liberalism' 6 and its "piecemeal and
often erratic reform attempts.'
' 7
The New Economic Mechanism of 1968 was the first im-
portant milestone in Hungary's economic transformation.' 8
The 1968 reforms rejected the former system of central, man-
datory planning and introduced a more competitive environ-
ment of profit-driven state enterprises centrally regulated on
only a macroeconomic level. 9 As a result of the 1968 reforms,
Hungary's economy grew between 1972 and 1978. However,
the country also suffered from unsophisticated trade exports,
decreased terms of trade, increased inflation, and increased
foreign debts.2 °
The Hungarian government resorted to a more centralistic
approach to respond to these problems. 2' The shift in econom-
14. BEREND, supra note 13, at 190, 294.
15. Brada & Dobozi, supra note 13, at 3.
16. Clarke, supra note 13, at 14.
17. HIERONYMI, supra note 11, at 65.
18. During the 1940s and 1950s, the Hungarian economy was a traditional
Soviet-style command economy characterized by nationalized banks and industries,
state and cooperative ownership, and compulsory plan indices. BEREND, supra note
13, at 2-6. The period between 1953 and 1968 was marked by a more indirect
form of economic regulation, which introduced a limited number of reforms to
increase company autonomy and provide profit incentives for market growth.
BEREND, supra note 13, at 168-90. See generally BEREND & RANKI, supra note 13.
19. Specifically, between 1968 and 1972, the reforms pushed for increased
company autonomy under a profit regulation system, changes in the pricing system
to better reflect domestic value relations and international market prices, and
partial decentralization of investment decisions whereby companies would compete
for investment credits and capital allotments from the state budget. REVESZ, supra
note 13, at 61-79.
20. RICHET, supra note 13, at 4; See also REVESZ, supra note 13, at 88-100.
Arguably, these problems were the result of a host of external factors such as the
explosion of oil prices in 1979, which led to increased energy import prices and
decreased terms of trade, and the inflation of interest rates, which led to in-
creased debt burdens. Clarke, supra note 13, at 46.
21. Specifically, some of the measures taken were attempts to correlate domes-
tic prices to international market prices, to connect producer prices with consumer
prices, to dismantle the branch ministries and unify bureaucratic institutions, to
break up monopolistic state companies and encourage smaller private and coopera-
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ic policy during the period between 1979 and 1984 emphasized
the priorities of external trade balance over growth, and stan-
dard of living over investment.22 Although this short-term
recentralization23 appeared to be a temporary step back from
the 1968 efforts to minimize bureaucratic influence in microec-
onomic decisions, the centralist reforms of the 1970s did par-
tially manage to accomplish some economic goals, such as debt
stabilization and external balance.24 Despite the good inten-
tions behind these reforms, economic stagnation pervaded the
country in the years between 1978 and 1986,25 and a deep
economic crisis hit during the late 1980s. The economy contin-
ued to suffer from severe inflationary pressures, excessive
reliance on foreign credit, an intractable debt problem, declin-
ing export market shares, and decreased real wages and living
standards. While drastic changes were obviously necessary,
the reasons for Hungary's economic failures in the 1970s and
1980s are still unclear. Most of the criticism centers on the
inadequacies of the regulatory mechanisms rather than exter-
nal political and economic factors.2
The late 1980s and early 1990s ushered in one of the big-
gest waves of economic reforms in Hungarian history. New
economic regulations have focused on promoting privatization
of businesses, encouraging foreign investment, and diversifying
tive enterprises, to improve labor incentives by allowing election of company heads
by employees, to transform a single banking system into a decentralized two-tier
banking system, and to enact a bankruptcy law. REVESZ, supra note 13, at 88-119;
Brada & Dobozi, supra note 13, at 5-6.
22. RICHET, supra note 13, at 3.
23. RICHET, supra note 13, at 4.
24. RICHET, supra note 13, at 5.
25. By 1984, the two principal sources of enterprise profits were subsidies and
inflation. Clarke, supra note 13, at 18.
26. Brada & Dobozi, supra note 13, at 6.
27. The reasons cited for the ineffectiveness of the reforms are political insta-
bility and lack of a truly competitive environment; political opposition by advocates
for social justice; overambitious and misdirected economic policies; failure to reduce
monopolies; protracted balance-of-payments problems; excessive reliance on fiscal
distributions instead of real capital market mechanisms; failure to free enterprises
from central control; excessive subsidization; short-term economic outlook; insula-
tion of microeconomic mechanisms from macroeconomic considerations; price con-
trols; and piecemeal nature of the reforms. Brada & Dobozi, supra note 13, at 7-
12. See generally RICHET, supra note 13, at 182-83 (arguing that the economic
failures in Hungary during the 1960s and 1970s discredited the concept of combin-
ing a planned economy with market factors, and proved that Hungary needed to
implement more radical reforms to meet the challenges of the future).
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corporate structure in order to improve international competi-
tiveness. 28 Significantly, this new phase appears to be a wiser
and more cautious approach, promoting not only economic
growth but also recognizing the social and political pitfalls of
quickly conceived and inadequately implemented reforms.
29
However, in their efforts to provide a regulatory framework in
conformity with the international community, the Hungarians
appear to have promulgated securities regulations to allay
fears on the part of foreign investors rather than to implement
well-developed economic and social policies.30
B. The Budapest Stock Exchange Today
The resurrection of the Budapest Stock Exchange was a
gradual process. Initially, only state-owned companies could
28. Given the tremendous volume of recent legislation, it would be impractical
to address every law relevant to the economy in Hungary today. However, a sam-
pling of the more important legislation will provide an idea of the character of the
legislation currently in effect and will provide a context in which better to under-
stand the purpose and consequences of Hungary's insider dealing restrictions. The
banking reforms enacted on January 1, 1987, devolved the traditional commercial
and investment banking functions to the private sector. The new banking law
enacted on November 13, 1992, is expected to ease certain restrictions against
foreign investors in hopes of encouraging foreign investment in the Hungarian
financial services sector. See Hungary's New Banking Law Expected to Encourage
More Foreign Investment, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), (Dec. 18, 1991). In 1988 and
1989, a personal income tax, value-added tax, general turnover tax, and entrepre-
neurial profit tax were introduced to increase state revenue. See REVESZ, supra
note 13, at 144-45; Clarke, supra note 13, at 23; HIERONYMI, supra note 11, at 81-
82. Act XIII of 1989 on the Transformation of Business Organizations and Compa-
nies officially promulgated an aggressive privatization program to transform state
or cooperatively owned entities into private companies. Acknowledging the need to
raise capital and diversify corporate structure, Act XX=V of 1988 About Invest-
ments of Foreigners in Hungary was introduced to protect foreign investments in
Hungary. Additionally, Act VI of 1988 on Economic Associations was enacted to
raise private and foreign corporate investment and to provide more business orga-
nizational choices. See HIERONYMI, supra note 11, at 82; REVESZ, supra note 13, at
147. Finally, on January 25, 1990, the Hungarian Parliament enacted Act VI of
1990 on Issuing and Public Broking of Certain Securities and on Stock Exchange
to provide a regulatory framework for the newly reopened Budapest Stock Ex-
change.
29. See Clarke, supra note 13, at 23 (arguing that the September 1987
Programme for Stabilization is a "de facto rejection of the economic concept ...
[and] hope for accelerated growth"). This consolidation program aims to ensure
economic stabilization and long term prosperity by combining strict austerity regu-
lations with market economic reforms. Danube Blues, supra note 11, at 48.
30. See also infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text for further development
of this proposition.
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issue stocks, and only state-owned banks and cooperatives
could purchase stocks.3' In 1981 bonds were first issued by
local councils through the National Savings Bank.32 Because
their interest rates exceeded those of the traditional savings
deposits, these bonds enjoyed quick popularity.3 The right to
issue bonds was later extended to businesses in 1983. The
corporate bond market also experienced fast-paced growth, but
reached its peak of thirty billion HUF in 1988.84 In 1987 the
right to issue bonds was granted to commercial banks, which,
along with other financial institutions, conducted stock ex-
change trading on a weekly basis.3 5 Over-the-counter facilities
opened for bonds in the 1980s and for shares in 1989.36 Trea-
sury bills and corporate certificates of deposit were introduced
in 1988. 37 On January 1, 1989, regulations allowing compa-
nies to issue shares to the public opened the secondary market
for purchases by private individuals.38 Finally, following the
legal regulatory framework provided by the 1990 Securities
Act, the Budapest Stock Exchange was formally reopened on
June 21, 1990.
39
The Budapest Stock Exchange of today is a fledgling mar-
ket wrought by economic risks and political uncertainties."
The securities market is plagued with both an inadequate
supply of profitable and promising businesses to issue reward-
ing securities, and a low demand for securities by confident
and wealthy investors. On the supply side, the primary mar-
ket, composed of issuers of publicly traded shares, suffers from
prevalent state ownership, underdeveloped financial infrastruc-
31. Hungary Capitalists, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 1988, at 90.
32. Order Please, BANKER, Feb. 1988, at 14 (also noting that the first paper
issued was actually the state paper of the 1950s).
33. Id.
34. Lajos Bokros, Fresh Priorities for Pioneer Market, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1991,
at 49.
35. Order Please, supra note 32, at 14; Act of Faith, BANKER, July 1990, at
38.
36. Act of Faith, supra note 35, at 38.
37. Bokros, supra note 34; Big Ambitions, BANKER, Apr. 1989, at 58.
38. Big Ambitions, supra note 37, at 58; Hungary Capitalists, supra note 31,
at 90.
39. Torday, supra note 8, at 21. Hungary enjoyed a "lively stock exchange"
from 1861 until 1948, when it was closed down by the new Communist rulers.
Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1.
40. Torday, supra note 8, at 21; Berniker, supra note 9, at 18A.
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ture, inexperienced management, cash shortage, and weak
investment capability.41 Acknowledging the need for foreign
capital investment, technological expertise, and management
know-how in order to increase profitability of its businesses,
Hungary has diligently pursued an ambitious privatization
program.42 However, privatization poses a special dilemma for
Hungarians, who recognize the need for foreign expertise and
investment, but simultaneously fear the prospect of foreign
involvement in the Hungarian economy.43
The Budapest Stock Exchange also suffers from an illiquid
secondary market, whose domestic and foreign investors are
unwilling to risk investing in an unreliable market of publicly
traded shares.' Low domestic demand has been largely fos-
tered by a deeper ambivalence about capitalism as well as
inexperience in the trading of securities on the part of Hungar-
41. Steven Greenhouse, East Europe's Sale of the Century, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 1990, at D1; Nigel Ash, The Privatisation Dilemma, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1990,
at 146, 148. Supply side problems include the low profitability of companies, the
unsophisticated telecommunications system, the lack of modern accounting proce-
dures and independent auditors, and the underdeveloped clearing and settlement
procedures. Id. at 148; Andy Zipser, Bid and Asked in Budapest, a Look at
Hungary's Stock Scene, BARRON'S, July 17, 1991, at 17, 42; Donlan, supra note 12,
at 46; Now for the Acid Test, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1990, at 40, 44. See also Ban,
supra note 10 (noting the "growing number of corporations . . . slipping into the
red"). Ilona Hardy, the former head of the Securities Trading Commission at the
Budapest Stock Exchange, has more optimistically stated that most companies are
largely undervalued and that the only thing holding back the "blossoming" primary
market and its "vigorous" issuance of new securities is the lack of liquidity.
Donlan, supra note 12, at 46. But see London's Lead Looks Impregnable,
EUROMONEY, May 1990, at 70 (emphasizing that liquidity is of primary importance
and that, in fact, "[i]nvestors' choice of marketplace is dictated by liquidity, and
issuers' choice by the amount of capital available oh which they can draw").
42. See Torday, supra note 8, at 21 (noting that the key to the success of the
Hungarian securities market will be the privatization program of the Hungarian
government). See also Emerging Stock Markets, supra note 6 (emphasizing that
Hungary is the most advanced among the Eastern European countries in privatiza-
tion success); Berniker, supra note 9, at 2A, 18A (describing Hungary as "leaping
ahead of its East European neighbors" in its accelerated economic reforms and
overhaul of its financial sector, as evidenced by the "flourishing" stock exchange,
"surging" investment, and "sprouting" commercial banks). Of additional interest is
that Hungary is the first Eastern European country to open a stock market, and
this development is primarily a result of development in its private sector.
43. Ash, supra note 41, at 145-48.
44. Acid Test, supra note 41, at 44. See also Act of Faith, supra note 35, at
38; Donlan, supra note 12, at 46 (arguing that the problem with the exchange is
not the growing primary market, but the stagnant secondary market). But see
Humphreys, supra note 12, at 44 (claiming that there is a "real frenzy for
shares").
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ians as a whole.45 Reluctance on the part of foreign investors
stems from the practical difficulties of evaluating an unpredict-
able future and of adjusting to an underdeveloped financial
system.46 To increase the confidence of the investing public,
Hungary has taken steps to improve its regulatory practices
and technological systems.47
45. See Greenhouse, supra note 41 (noting that Hungarians want to enjoy the
benefits of a market economy-greater efficiency, abundant and higher quality
goods, high living standards, but are also beginning to recognize the drawbacks of
capitalism-longer and harder workdays, more layoffs, and greater social divisions
between the rich and the poor); Phyllis Berman, An Impolite Question: Were You a
Communist?, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1990, at 131, 133 (observing that profit is "still a
dirty word" and that "money-making has a kind of taint" in Hungary). See also
Act of Faith, supra note 35, at 38 (commenting that the problem with the ex-
change is that for Hungarians the act of buying and selling securities is "more an
act of faith than a habit of buying"). Cf Humphreys, supra note 12, at 44 (stating
that "Hungarians tend to spend what they have immediately as a means of coping
with inflation"); BUDAPEST STOCK EXCHANGE, GENERAL INFORMATION 4 (1991) (em-
phasizing that while the financial savings of Hungarians increased significantly in
1991, these resources were not invested in the stock exchange, but transformed
into more secure bank deposits and deposit-like securities issued by banks, and
that this more cautious savings attitude was induced by increasing unemployment,
social problems, competitive deposit rates pursued by banks, and a vicious circle of
lower demand for securities and falling prices).
] 46. See Greenhouse, supra note 41 (quoting a foreign banker as saying that
"[t]he future is more difficult to tell in Eastern Europe than elsewhere because
things are changing so rapidly"). See also Torday, supra note 8, at 21 (stating that
the dearth of profitable Hungarian enterprises is partially caused by the absence
of anything resembling a western balance sheet or profit and loss statement);
Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1 (commenting that the typical prospectus, accounting
practices, and ownership identification procedures in Hungary fail to satisfy West-
ern demands and generally accepted standards); Capital Markets: Big Ambitions,
BANKER, Apr. 1989, at 48 (recognizing the need for more and better equipped
brokers, rating agencies, analysts, auditors, and electronic data-processing services);
Humphreys, supra note 12, at 45 (noting the problem of converting dividends and
capital gains into hard currency).
47. For example, the United States Securities Exchange Commission, the Hun-
garian Supervisory Board of Securities, and the Budapest Stock Exchange have
signed a statement of understanding regarding American technical assistance in
the development of Hungarian securities markets. The purpose of the SEC consul-
tations is to identify specific types of technical assistance which may be provided
in the future. Future assistance may be in one or all of the following areas: per-
sonnel training, information, and advice relating to the development of order han-
dling systems; trade recording and comparison systems; quotation and transaction
data; transmission systems; clearing and settlement mechanisms; regulatory re-
quirements relating to market professionals and capital adequacy; systems and
related regulatory mechanisms relating to accounting and disclosures; systems
necessary for market surveillance and enforcement programs; and, investor protec-
tion practices and procedures. SEC, Hungarian Stock Officials Sign Statement on
U.S. Technical Assistance, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA) (June 29, 1990).
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Despite the ambiguities associated with Hungary's capital
market, there are also indications that the Budapest Stock
Exchange will succeed in the future. Recently, the economy has
shown signs of improvement.48 Furthermore, Hungary is still
the most economically advanced among its Central and East-
ern European neighbors. Specifically, its privatization program
is recognized as the most advanced in Central and Eastern
Europe, and the reopening of its stock exchange is a first in
the area.49 With a securities regulatory framework, privatiza-
tion program, and foreign investment incentive package in
place, there is hope for a more profitable future.5 °
By including an insider dealing restriction in its 1990
Securities Act, Hungary appears to have adopted a policy
against insider dealing in its securities markets. However, it
remains unclear whether the primary motivation in enacting
this prohibition was to protect inexperienced Hungarian inves-
tors from market exploitation by corporate insiders or to en-
hance the international reputation of and confidence in the
Budapest Stock Exchange. Because the driving force behind
most of the recent legislation seems to be the stimulation of
foreign investment, it appears likely that the main purpose
behind the insider trading regulation is to conf6rm to the grow-
ing international consensus of prohibiting such activity, rather
than to protect the virtually nonexistent domestic investing
public.5 Notwithstanding the official policy against insider
trading, it is additionally unclear whether the Hungarian stat-
48. Positive signs include increased hard currency reserves, population savings
of HUF 814 billion, falling inflation and interest rates, stability of the forint, posi-
tive balance of payments, and capital flow of USD 1.1 to 1.2 billion. Negative
signs include the lagging tax revenue, a budgetary deficit of HUF 66.7 billion,
increasing unemployment, and frequent bankruptcy. BUDAPEST STOCK EXCHANGE,
REPORT ON APRIL, 1992, at 3-4 (1992). For specific numbers regarding market
activity, see also BUDAPEST STOCK EXCHANGE, REPORT ON THE 1ST QUARTER OF
1992 (1992).
49. Hungary is "still the brightest star in Eastern Europe, ... the most
Westernized nation of the former East bloc, (the place] where outsiders feel most
comfortable plunking down their money." Gail E. Schares & Ken Olsen, Hungary:
A Giant Step Ahead, BUS. WK., Apr. 15, 1991, at 58.
50. For an optimistic, albeit biased, view, see ARPAD ABONYI, HUNGARY, THE
FIRST CHOICE FOR BUSINESS IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE (a brochure developed
as part of the Canadian government's technical assistance to the Hungarian In-
vestment and Trade Promotion Agency). For more information on investment op-
portunities in Hungary, contact Investcenter-Tradeinform in Budapest, Hungary.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 111-13; see also infra note 113.
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ute will remain as a mere showcase of Hungarian efforts to
conform, or will be vigorously enforced as an important eco-
nomic policy. After all, while Hungarians may be desperate to
play it straight, inside information may be the only informa-
tion available on the small market, and insider trading is at
least trading.52
III. AN OVERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
A. Insider Trading Regulation in the United States
The United States relies on centralized regulation and
disclosure mechanisms in its governance of public trading of
securities.53 The development of securities law in the United
States has been a complex blend of statutory, legislative, and
administrative activity by Congress, the courts, and the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission.54 Despite the absence of any stat-
utory definition of insider trading, the term has generally come
to mean "the act of purchasing or selling securities while in
possession of material, nonpublic information concerning an
issue of securities."" The three primary legislative sources of
federal regulation of the trading of securities based on inside
information are: (1) rule 10b-5, the antifraud provisions pro-,
mulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934; (2) section 16(b), the strict liability against
short-swing trading provided under the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934; and (3) rule 14e-3, the insider trading
prohibitions in the context of tender offers, promulgated pursu-
52. Tozsde Kurir, Hungary: Report on Insider Trading, REUTER TEXTLINE,
Sept. 20, 1990, at 1; Torday, supra note 8, at 21; Hamilton, supra note 11, at 1.
53. Elyse Diamond, Note, Outside Investors: A New Breed of Insider Traders?,
60 FORDHAM L. REV. 5319, 5320 (1992). See also BARRY A. K. RIDER & H. LEIGH
FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 9-24 (1979) (providing a survey of
the disclosure scheme in relation to insider trading). The preventative role of the
disclosure requirements and the deterrent effect of enforcement by the SEC are
crucial to the successful regulation of insider trading.
54. For thorough treatises on the development of insider trading law in the
United States, see, e.g., Bloomenthal, supra note 2, ch. 9; LOUIS Loss, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, chs. 7F, 9B (1988 & 1992 Supp.); RIDER &
FFRENCH, supra note 53, chs. 2-4.
55. Richard J. Hunter & Philip Friese, The Genesis of an Ethical Imperative:
The SEC in Transition, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 28 (1989-90) (quoting STUART C.
GOLDBERG, ESQ., SEC TRADING RESTRICTIONS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR
INSIDERS 2-3 (1973)).
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ant to section 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.56
1. Rule 10b-5
Rule 10b-5 has become the primary judicial tool and ad-
ministrative policing device to combat securities trading on the
basis of material nonpublic information." Rule 10b-5 makes
the following activities unlawful: (1) employing any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2) misstating a material fact or
omitting a statement of material fact which would cause previ-
ous statements to be misleading; or (3) operating a fraud or
deceit on any person in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.58 Ironically, rule 10b-5 was not originally de-
signed to deal with the insider trading problem.59 Neverthe-
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992); 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3 (1989). See also section 21(a) which provides for sanctions against viola-
tors of these provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 21a (1993).
57. BERNARD BERGMANS, INSIDE INFORMATION AND SECURITIES TRADING 9
(1991). [lIt is difficult to think of another instance in the entire corpus juris in
which the interaction of the legislative, administrative rulemaking, and judicial
processes has produced so much from so little." LOSS, supra note 54, at 726. Chief
Justice Rehnquist has similarly referred to rule 10b-5 as the "judicial oak which
has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
58. The exact words of rule 10b-5 are set out below:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
59. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 53, at 72. Prior to the enactment of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, insider trading was governed by one of three
forms of the common law duty owed by officers or directors as corporate fiducia-
ries. The majority or strict rule, in holding that officers and directors have a fidu-
ciary obligation to the corporation and to the stockholders in their dealings with
or on behalf of the corporation, relieved officers and directors from any affirmative
duty to disclose, absent any actual misrepresentation. The minority or fiduciary
rule held corporate insiders to fiduciary standards in their dealings with stockhold-
ers, and thus required full disclosure of all material facts. A third and moderate
approach was the "special circumstances" doctrine, which considered all specific
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less, the wide scope of insider trading covered by rule 10b-5
has engendered broad insider trading liability and diverse
judicial interpretations of the nature of an insider trading
violation.0
a. The Disclose or Abstain Doctrine
The disclose or abstain doctrine forms the predominant
concept of insider trading liability under rule 10b-5. The rule,
which was first introduced in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,61 re-
quires "anyone in possession of material inside information" to
"disclose it to the investing public," or to "abstain from trading
in or recommending the securities concerned" until such infor-
mation is disclosed.62 Under the Cady rationale, the duty to
disclose or abstain arises when two elements exist: (1) "a rela-
tionship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone"; and (2) "[an] inherent un-
fairness involved where a party takes advantage of such infor-
mation knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing. '63 Cady was significant because it appeared to extend
the applicability of rule 10b-5 from face-to-face negotiations to
open market transactions, and from traditional corporate insid-
ers to all persons with access to inside information.' The dis-
close or abstain rule did not ban trading based on inside infor-
mation, nor did it require disclosure of inside information. The
rule enables investors to trade on the basis of inside informa-
tion provided that they disclose the information prior to trad-
ing, and conversely, allows insiders to avoid disclosing confi-
dential information so long as they refrain from any trading
activity until public disclosure.
facts regarding the insider's special position and knowledge in order to determine
whether the defendant had a duty to act in good faith by fully disclosing all mate-
rial information before a sale or purchase of securities. Loss, supra note 54, at
724.
60. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 36 (Securities
Law Series 1990).
61. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (an administrative suit brought by the Securities
Exchange Commission).
62. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)).
63. 40 S.E.C. at 911-12.
64. BERGMANS, supra note 57, at 10.
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b. The Informational Parity Approach
The informational parity theory contends that all investors
trading on impersonal exchanges should have equal access to
material information.65 The equality of information approach
would extend 10b-5 liability from traditional corporate insid-
ers, who trade with a shareholder on the basis of inside infor-
mation, to outsider tippees completely unaffiliated with the
issuer, who trade on an impersonal exchange without disclos-
ing the tip. During the post-Cady era, United States case law
seemed to move toward this broader policy, and courts ap-
peared to adopt this fairness-based rationale to expand 10b-5
liability to tippees.66 Because of the confusing case law, the
access to information theory is neither clear nor consistent, but
the common denominator is the focus on the relationship be-
tween the trader and the inside information.67 One commen-
tator has argued that the theory is merely a generic term des-
ignating the three criteria used to impose a duty to disclose or
abstain-access to information, possession of information, and
informational advantage resulting from unequal access or
unequal possession.6" Because of its potentially unlimited
scope, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the parity of
information rationale.69
65. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848 (seemingly adopting
the broad informational parity policy by stating that "Rule [10b-5] is based in
policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material informa-
tion.").
66. RIDER & FFRENOH, supra note 53, at 75; Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of
Insider Trading in a Global Marketplace: A Uniform Statutory Approach, 66 TUL.
L. REV. 837, 841-43 (1992) (classifying the entire period from the 1930s through
the 1970s as an era of expansion). See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (holding employees of a bank designated as a
stock transfer agent for tribal assets of Ute Indians liable under 10b-5 because
they secretly bought and resold stock for personal benefit); Ross v. Licht, 263 F.
Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding tippees liable because they knew or should
have known of the inside nature of.the tip).
67. BERGMANS, supra note 57, at 45.
68. BERGMANS, supra note 57, at 45.
69. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (citing Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977), stating that not every in-
stance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under section 10(b)).
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c. The Fiduciary Duty Approach
The fiduciary duty approach limits the scope of 10b-5 lia-
bility by requiring that a fiduciary nexus exist between the
corporate insider who trades or tips while in possession of
inside information and the issuer whose securities are being
traded or whose confidential information is being disclosed. °
Under this restrictive approach, a duty to disclose or abstain
does not arise out of the possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation, but rather is contingent upon the existence of some
relationship of trust or confidence between the parties to the
transaction. The fiduciary relationship requirement has been
imposed by the United States Supreme Court in recent years
to limit the broad scope of 10b-5 liability characteristic of the
post-Cady era.7' Specifically, 10b-5 liability is limited to trad-
ers who possess inside information by virtue of some fiduciary
relationship with the issuer, to tippers who disclose inside
information in breach of a fiduciary duty to the issuer and for
personal gain, and to tippees who receive tips from tippers that
they know or should know are breaching their fiduciary duty
to the issuer.
d. The Misappropriation Theory
Under the misappropriation theory, a violation of rule 10b-
5 occurs when a person entrusted with confidential inside
information misuses that knowledge by secretly trading on it
70. The fiduciary aspect of insider trading liability derives from the mention
of fraud in section 10 and rule 10b-5. Given the traditional common law notions
connecting fraud and misrepresentation with issues of fiduciary duty, a large por-
tion of judicial attention, especially in the context of private causes of action, has
focused on the elements required to establish a breach of fiduciary duty under
common law. The important issues in fiduciary law are: (1) nondisclosure, (2) ma-
teriality, (3) reliance, (4) causation, (5) privity, (6) scienter, and (7) market infor-
mation. See RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 53, at 76-90 (providing an overview of
fiduciary issues in the context of civil liability).
71. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222 (holding that a financial printer who decod-
ed the names of certain target companies in the course of his employment and
made purchases in those target companies had not violated rule iOb-5); Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (holding that a corporate officer who disclosed that the
company's assets were overstated and a securities analyst who disclosed that infor-
mation to his clients were not liable under rule 10b-5). See infra parts IV.C.1. and
IV.C.2. for a more detailed analysis comparing these cases to the Hungarian stat-
ute. See also Langevoort, supra note 1, at 7.
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for personal gain.72 The theory imposes a sort of fiduciary du-
ty upon persons in possession of market information. 3 A per-
son who has misappropriated material nonpublic information
is held to have an absolute duty to disclose that information or
refrain from trading.'4 This is an exception to the general
rule that parties have no obligation to disclose absent a fidu-
ciary relationship.75 Because of the restrictive effect of the
traditional fiduciary duty requirement, a number of courts
have sought to expand insider trading liability by adopting the
misappropriation theory.76 However, this theory has yet to be
expressly adopted or rejected by the Supreme Court, and its
validity remains unclear.
e. Materiality
In determining the scope of insider trading liability under
rule 10b-5, defining the nature of inside information is as im-
portant as identifying insiders. Inside information is generally
defined as material nonpublic information. The standard of
materiality articulated by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson requires "a showing of a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
'total mix' of information made available."77 Furthermore,
where information or events are contingent or speculative in
nature, materiality depends on "a balancing of both the indi-
72. Diamond, supra note 53, at 5323. See also Langevoort, supra note 1, at 7.
73. Market information is information developed by market analysts. This type
of information differs from inside information which is known and possessed by a
person by virtue of that person's inside status.
74. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 239-45; United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 19 (2d Cir. 1981),
affd after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
The issue has not yet been resolved by the Supreme Court, which affirmed United
States v. Carpenter on other grounds. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024,
1027-29 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1988) (member
of a law firm); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2nd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1053 (1985) (employee of a printing establishment); Newman, 664 F.2d 12
(employees of investment banks); Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (financial columnist).
77. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus-
tries Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). Note that TSC Industries
was not an insider trading case, but involved section 14(a), which deals with proxy
statements, and that the question of materiality was first addressed in the context
of a case not involving insider trading.
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cated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company
activity.""8 The Basic Court also adopted what has become
known as the fraud-on-the-market theory, which is "based on
the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities mar-
ket, the price of a company's stock is determined by the avail-
able material information regarding the company and its busi-
ness."79 The theory presupposes an efficient capital market,
where the current price of a security is the best estimate of
what the price of that security will be in the future.80
2. Section 16(b) Short-Swing Liability
In sharp contrast to the flexibility and scope of rule 10b-5
liability under United States case law, section 16(b) imposes
strict liability on a narrow group of statutorily defined insid-
ers. This short-swing trading provision prohibits directors,
officers, and beneficial owners of more than ten percent of any
class of any equity security from selling and purchasing or
purchasing and selling the same class of securities within a
time period of six months. Section 16 prohibits short-swing
trading by corporate insiders in three ways: (1) by requiring
disclosure of the transactions and holdings by corporate insid-
ers; (2) by providing for corporate recovery of short-swing prof-
its; and (3) by strictly prohibiting short-swing trading by cor-
porate insiders.8' Section 16 differs from section 10(b) in four
significant ways: (1) in its application to a narrow group of
corporate insiders for a limited time period; (2) in its imposi-
tion of strict liability without regard to whether inside infor-
mation actually existed or was actually used; (3) in its unique
remedy allowing recovery by the issuer to the exclusion of
other aggrieved parties; and (4) in its explicit prohibition
against trading by corporate insiders.8 2
78. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 P.2d
833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
79. 485 U.S. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-62 (3d Cir.
1986)).
80. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics:
An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990)
(providing an economically based legal criticism of the theory as explicated in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)-(c) (1988).
82..The purpose of section 16 was to provide an objective standard without
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3. Tender Offers and Rule 14e-3
Rule 14e-3 represents a congressional attempt to codify
insider trading law in the context.of tender offers. This rule
prohibits any person in possession of information relating to a
tender offer from trading in the target company's securities if:
(1) the bidder has taken a substantial step toward initiating a
tender offer; (2) the person possessing the information knows
or has reason to know that the information originated from the
bidder or target company; and (3) the person possessing infor-
mation knows or has reason to know that the information is
nonpublic.83 Rule 14e-3 applies to all persons in possession of
inside information, but only in the context of tender offer-relat-
ed activity. 4 Thus, a fiduciary relationship between the trad-
er or tipper and the target company or its shareholders is not
required to impose liability for trading while in possession of
information relating to a tender offer.8 5
proof of actual use of inside information over a period of time when insider trad-
ing was likely to occur. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 53, at 24. Before the enact-
ment of rule 14e-3, section 16 was the only provision which Congress specifically
enacted in the context of insider trading. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 53, at 17.
83. The exact language of rule 14e-3 is set out below:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or
has commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice within the meaning
of Section 14(e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession of
material information relating to such tender offer which information he
knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or has
reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender
offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting
on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or
cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities
convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or
right to obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless
within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information
and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1989).
84. Rule 14e-3 was enacted in direct response to the insider trading scandals
of the 1980s.
85. LANGEVOORT, supra note 60, at 195-96. In determining whether liability
for trading in possession of information related to a tender offer was limited by
the common law fiduciary duty requirement, the Second Circuit held that the
promulgation of rule 14e-3 by the SEC was a valid exercise of its administrative
rulemaking authority. United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990);
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). Whether courts
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4. Increased Sanctions Under ITSA and ITSFEA
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) autho-
rizes the Securities Exchange Commission to seek civil penal-
ties up to a maximum of three times the profit gained or loss
avoided from the unlawful purchase or sale of securities. 6
The ITSA also increases the maximum fine for criminal viola-
tion from $10,000 to $100,000. The Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) was enact-
ed to ensure closer supervision of employees with access to
material nonpublic information. 7 The ITSFEA imposes liabil-
ity on securities firms and other controlling persons who know-
ingly or recklessly fail to take appropriate steps to prevent
insider trading violations by their employees, and thereby
places some of the regulatory burden on institutional enti-
ties.'8
B. Insider Dealing9 Regulation in Hungary
Insider dealing in Hungary is governed primarily by a
single provision entitled "Restriction of Insider Dealing" in the
Hungarian statute regulating securities and stock exchang-
es,90 and is enforced by the Supervisory Board of Securities,
an administrative body supervised by the Ministry of Fi-
nance.9' The Hungarian regulatory scheme is a single nation-
wide system of securities regulation which focuses on the Bu-
dapest Stock Exchange.92 The stated policy of the securities
regulations is to foster capital flow, to promote securities mar-
have the authority to limit the broad liability under rule 14e-3 by imposing a
fiduciary duty requirement based on common law remains unclear.
86. Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
87. H.R. REP. No. 100-910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 17-22 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6054-59.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(b)(1) (1988).
89. The Hungarian statute refers to insider trading as insider dealing.
90. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, at pt. VI. Transactions conducted on the
Budapest Stock Exchange, currently the only public stock exchange in Hungary,
are also regulated by the Charter of the Budapest Stock Exchange and the Rules
of the Budapest Stock Exchange Regarding the Requirements of the Listing and
Trading of Securities on the Stock Exchange.
91. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, at pt. II.
92. See William J. Williams, Jr., Securities Regulation in Emerging Capital
Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1991 at 217 (1991).
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kets, and to safeguard investors.93 The regulations recognize
the importance of disclosure of information to promote equality
of information among investors and to foster confidence of
prospective investors. 96
The Hungarian statute prohibits the dealing of securities
based upon "confidential inside information."95 The materiali-
ty standard of the statute requires that such dealing or disclo-
sure "may effect substantially the value of securities."96 Confi-
dential inside information is further defined as information
"relating. to the financial, economic and legal situations of the
Issuer, Broker and Warrantor," particularly "new issues, major
deals, structural changes, turn-round projects and winding
up."
9 7
The statute identifies two main categories of insiders. The
first group, "qualified insiders," contains three subcategories:
(1.) chief executives and executive officers of the issuer, of the
issuer-broker, and of any legal person owning a major interest
in the issuer, as well as the close relatives of such executives;
(2) owners of ten percent or more of the issuer's authorized
capital and their close relatives; and (3) persons who have been
employed by or established "any kind of close working contact
with the Issuer... in a capacity giving them access to confi-
dential inside information," including auditors, legal advisors,
and tax consultants.9" The second group, "insiders," includes
two subcategories: (1) qualified insiders to whom confidential
information is handed; and (2) persons who have obtained
confidential information in any manner and who have know-
ingly had access to confidential inside information. 99 The first
subcategory refers to qualified insiders who are direct tippees
of inside information. The second subcategory refers to all
persons with access to inside information.
Insiders are prohibited from personally dealing in the
relevant securities, from dealing by proxy, and from divulging
93. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pmbl.
94. Rules Regarding the Requirements of the Listing and Trading of Securities
on the Stock Exchange, HUNG. HANDBOOK (1990); Ministry of Finance, Act on Secu-
rities and the Stock Exchange, in 64 PUBLIC FINANCE IN HUNGARY 25 (1990).
95. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, T 75.
96. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, 9 75(2).
97. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, T 75(2).
98. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, T 76(1).
99. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, T 76(2).
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inside information to whomever may be likely to benefit from
or to pass on such knowledge within the stock exchange. 00
Qualified insiders are further presumed to have committed
insider dealing when they resell or rebuy securities to or from
the same person within three months.'0 ' However, qualified
insiders can rebut this presumption by proving that confiden-
tial information was not available.0 2 Furthermore, qualified
insiders completely escape liability if they can prove that their
short-swing transaction falls under one of two statutory excep-
tions: (1) selling of a security as liquidator to pay creditors; or
(2) selling or purchasing of a security to or from a person who
had the same inside knowledge available. 3
IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INSIDER TRADING REGULA-
TION IN HUNGARY AND THE UNITED STATES
A. Prohibiting Insider Trading
The first question one should address before comparing
different regulatory approaches toward the trading of securi-
ties is whether insider trading should be outlawed at all.0 4
The ethical rationale offered in favor of prohibiting insider
trading is that allowing a select group of investors to acquire
pecuniary advantages simply by virtue of their inside status is
inherently unfair. Furthermore, some fairness arguments sug-
gest that all investors owe a moral obligation to others in the
marketplace to negotiate openly and on equal footing. The
economic rationale supporting a ban on insider trading is that
unequal access to information will undermine the confidence of
investors and the integrity of the market and deter prospective
investors from entering a risky and capricious market, inevita-
bly resulting in the demise of the market. Arguably, the mar-
ket should reward investors and market analysts for the toils
of intensive and insightful market research rather than arbi-
100. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, $ 77.
101. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, $ 78.
102. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, $ 78.
103. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, $ 79.
104. "One of the truly intriguing aspects of the entire problem of insider trad-
ing is the fact that, despite its having been widely written about and discussed for
many decades, few have paused to consider why insider trading should be regulat-
ed." W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 348 (1968), quoted in
BERGMANS, supra note 57, at 99.
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trarily benefitting investors based on prior status.
A number of commentators have also argued that insider
trading should not be prohibited.' °5 Some authors have criti-
cized the underlying fairness rationales which have "haunted"
the subject of insider trading as based on the unsophisticated
moral proposition that "it's just not right," promulgated by
angry "foot-stampers." °6 Attempting to remove the moralistic
tinge from insider trading, these commentators have shifted
the focus to market efficiency rationales. For example, it has
been argued that because inequalities are inherent in a capi-
talist market economy and because unequal access to informa-
tion is but one aspect of the risk factor, efforts to eliminate
insider trading and equalize the availability of material infor-
mation tend to destabilize the very essence of capitalism.' °
More recent articles contend that inside information is merely
another form of property and suggest that a regulatory scheme
should protect property rights in the use of inside informa-
tion. 8 Finally, free market economists contend that the
market should be left unregulated and that the leaking of
inside information by the "invisible hand" will spread the
wealth appropriately.
Despite the simmering academic debate, the international
condemnation of insider trading has survived, and the anti-
insider trading policy, long established in the United States,
has since been adopted by Hungary and others in the interna-
tional community. 9 Interestingly, the policy behind most of
105. See Henry G. Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REV.
113 (1966); HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
106. Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
727, 730-31 (1988), quoting MANNE, supra note 105 (providing the first attempt to
combine corporate law and ethical philosophy in the context of insider trading);
See also Jonathan R. Macey, Comment, Ethics, Economics, and Insider Trading:
Ayn Rand Meets the Theory of the Firm, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 785 (1988)
(critiquing Professor Lawson's analysis).
107. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 53, at xiii.
108. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 80; Jonathan R. Macey, From Fair-
ness to Contracts: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984).
109. The relative novelty of anti-insider trading legislation around the world
suggests a deeper uncertainty of the extent to which insider trading is inefficient
or unfair. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Regulation of Insider Trading in
,the European Community, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1037, 1052-56 (1991) (arguing
that in spite of supporting the "market function objective," there is little underly-
ing thought behind the EC Directive. "The linkage between fair play, enhanced
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the restrictions has linked the fairness and economic efficiency
rationales, reasoning that unequal access to information under-
mines the confidence of investors, which in turn adversely
affects the market."' Recognizing that regulation of securi-
ties trading and stock exchanges is necessary to prevent abus-
es and foster markets that merit and retain investor confi-
dence,"' Hungary included a restriction on insider dealing
when enacting its Act on Securities and Stock Exchange. The
Ministry of Finance claims that the restrictions were enacted
with the conviction that the two crucial driving forces behind a
developed securities market are openness and confidence of
prospective investors."' It remains unclear whether the pur-
pose of the law was to protect domestic investors or to attract
foreign investors. However, given the acute need for foreign
investment and relative inexperience with a functioning securi-
ties market, it appears that Hungary has adopted an insider
trading ban as part of a larger economic reform which requires
international recognition." 3
B. Defining Insider Dealing by Statute
One major difference between insider trading law in Hun-
gary and the United States is that the civil law of Hungary
defines insider dealing by statute, while the definition of insid-
er trading in the United States emerges from both statutory
interpretation and common law."4 Hungary has defined in-
confidence, and improved market function does not appear to have been intensely
analyzed by the drafters of the directive. Apparently, the linkage was intuitively
self-evident to the Commission.").
110. See EC Insider Dealing Directive, supra note 3; UK Insider Dealing Act,
supra note 3; Japan Securities Exchange Law, supra note 3.
111. For a good introduction to the securities regulatory framework in Hunga-
ry, see Samuel Wolff et al., Securities Regulation in Central Europe: Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 103 (1992). See also James R. Doty,
Capital Market Developments in Central and Eastern Europe: The SEC Perspective,
in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS, 1991 111 (Corporate Law and Practice,
PLI Course Handbook Series No. 743, 1991); Williams, Jr., supra note 92.
112. Ministry of Finance, supra note 94, at 25.
113. See supra parts II.A. through. II.B. The Hungarian statute does state that
its purpose is to foster capital flow, promote the securities market, and safeguard
investors. The statute further recognizes that "economic publicity" is a necessary
precondition for the proper functioning of a securities market. 1990 Securities Act,
supra note 6, pmbl.
114. Because civil law in Hungary requires that insider dealing be defined by
statute, the differences between a statutory and case law definition of the prohibi-
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sider dealing as dealing in securities based on confidential
inside information, or divulging such information, which may
effect substantially the value of securities."5 Insider trading
in the United States has also come to mean trading in securi-
ties based on material nonpublic information, or divulging such
information.
116
Proponents of a uniform statutory definition argue that a
vague definition produces unpredictable patterns of exonera-
tion and liability, which may in themselves discourage inves-
tors from entering the market.117 Ambiguous standards may
also inconsistently deter the cautious and honest while encour-
aging the risk-takers and dishonest to make inside deals. Fi-
nally, inconsistencies may hinder fair and effective enforce-
ment, and vague standards are unfair to honest and naive
investors who may be vulnerable to liability without notice.
Advocates of a case-by-case definition emphasize the bene-
fits of flexibility. Some argue that the definition of insider
trading in the United States is clear, and that attempts at a
uniform definition would unnecessarily risk underinclusive-
ness. Others suggest that a statutory definition would reduce
room for interpretation and increase opportunities to create
loopholes."' Furthermore, vagueness may even enhance de-
terrence. Some arguments suggest that allowing trading on the
basis of inside information enhances market efficiency, and
that prohibiting insider trading unnecessarily restricts the free
and efficient flow of information." 9
The adverse consequences of a broad or vague definition of
insider trading may be exacerbated in an underdeveloped mar-
tion against insider dealing are more a function of the differences between civil
and common law systems, rather than the result of elaborate decisionmaking on
the part of Hungary.
115. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, '1 75, 77.
116. BERGMANS, supra note 57, at 17.
117. Vagueness would produce two types of "trading errors" which would obvi-
ate the free flow of information. First, "transactions that may in fact be legal will
be avoided by the risk averse because of the chilling effect that results from am-
biguous standards." Second, "other transactions that may be illegal will be entered
into by those who are relatively risk prone." Salbu, supra note 66, at 856.
118. This is the official position of the United States Securities Exchange Com-
mission.
119. Salbu, supra note 66, at 854. See also SEC to Bring More Insider Trading
Cases, But Not for Several Months, Ruder Says, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
50, 1923, 1924 (1987).
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ket economy such as Hungary's today. The need for clear stan-
dards may be especially vital to the successful development of
an emerging market which has not yet risen to the same level
of maturity and efficiency as that existing presently in the
United States.
120
C. Identifying the Scope of Insiders
The Hungarian Securities Act identifies three categories of
insiders: (1) traditional corporate insiders, including executive
officers of the issuer, close relatives of such officers, and benefi-
cial owners of ten percent or more of the securities in ques-
tion;121 (2) a special category of insiders identified as such by
virtue of their working relationships with the issuer;122 and
(3) two categories of tippees. 123 The statute prohibits three
forms of insider dealing transactions: (1) dealing in securities
related to confidential inside information; (2) dealing by proxy
of another person in such securities; and (3) divulging confi-
dential inside information to whomever may be likely to bene-
fit from such knowledge or to pass on such knowledge within
the stock exchange. Thus, the Hungarian definition of insiders
includes traditional and nontraditional insiders in the form of
traders, tippers, and tippees.
120. See Act of Faith, supra note 35, at 37 (stating that "a proper capital mar-
ket will never re-emerge unless the framework is first in place"). See also Big
Ambitions, supra note 37, at 58 (noting a study by a securities trading commission
listing the absence of a legal framework as an obstacle to the proper development
of a capital market).
121. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, 9 76(1)(a)-(c).
122. The Hungarian statute defines these insiders as persons who have had
any kind of close working contact with the issuer within the last six months in a
capacity giving them access to confidential inside information. 1990 Securities Act,
supra note 6, pt. VI, 9 76(1)(d).
123. The Hungarian statute identifies two types of tippees: (1) traditional corpo-
rate insiders or insiders by virtue of their working relationship to whom confiden-
tial information is handed; and (2) persons who obtained such information in any
manner and who knowingly had access to confidential inside information. 1990
Securities Act, supra note 6, T 76(2)(d). It is unclear why the statute makes an
extra effort to identify qualified insiders as tippees, given that such qualified in-
siders would presumably be liable for insider trading or tipping regardless of the
manner in which they received confidential information. Perhaps the provision was
added to emphasize that qualified insiders may be liable as tippees and to prevent
qualified insiders from escaping liability under the exceptions to the prohibition on
short-swing trading. See 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, 99 76, 77. For a more
thorough treatment of tippees, see infra parts IV.C.2.a., IV.C.2.c., IV.C.3.a-c.
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In the United States, insiders are identified by the courts
on a case-by-case basis. The ad hoc approach in the United
States has produced a rather unclear definition of insider. Still,
the following categories of insiders have emerged: (1) tradition-
al corporate insiders, as defined by section 16(b) of the Securi-
ties Act;124 (2) persons with direct or indirect access to inside
information, as per the Cady rationale;" (3) persons with
some form of fiduciary duty to the other parties in the transac-
tion; 126 and (4) persons who obtain an informational advan-
tage by unlawful means. 27 Thus, American courts have in-
cluded in their definition of insider traditional and nontradi-
tional traders, tippers, and tippees. However, an examination
of Chiarella v. United States,'128 Dirks v. S.E.C.,129 and Uni-
ted States v. Chestman3 0 in light of the Hungarian statute
will reveal that the scope of insiders encompassed by the Hun-
garian definition is broader.
1. Insiders With a Fiduciary Duty v. Insiders With
Informational Access
a. Chiarella's Fiduciary Duty Approach
The Supreme Court decision in Chiarella v. United States
was significant because it delineated the boundaries of 10b-5
liability under the broad "disclose or abstain" rule. The post-
Cady and pre-Chiarella years were an era of expansive insider
trading liability under the informational parity rationale. 131
By imposing a fiduciary duty requirement on insider liability,
the Supreme Court put a halt to the growing scope of insiders
to whom thedisclose or abstain rule applied.
124. Traditional corporate insiders include directors, officers, and beneficial
owners of more than ten percent of any class of any equity security. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p (1988). See also supra part III.A.2.
125. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See also supra part
III.A.l.a.
126. See Dirks v. Securities Exchange Commission, 463 U.S. 646 (1983);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See also supra part III.A.1.c.
127. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also supra
part III.A.1.d.
128. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
129. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
130. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
131. See BERGMANS, supra note 57, at 11-12; Salbu, supra note 66, at 841-43.
See also supra part III.A.1.c.
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Vincent Chiarella was a mark-up man employed at a fi-
nancial printing company. 132 During the course of his em-
ployment, Chiarella handled five documents containing the
concealed identities of the acquiring and target corporations to
be involved in upcoming corporate takeover bids.133 Chiarella
artfully decoded the names of the target companies, purchased
stock in the companies without disclosing his knowledge, and
sold the shares at a profit of $30,000 immediately after the
takeover attempts were publicly announced.3 4 Following in-
vestigation by the Securities Exchange Commission, Chiarella
was charged with and convicted of violating section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5. 35
The crucial question in Chiarella was whether a person,
who was neither a corporate insider nor a recipient of confiden-
tial information from a target company, was an insider subject
to rule 10b-5 criminal liability. The Court reversed Chiarella's
conviction on the grounds that Chiarella owed no affirmative
duty to the selling target companies to disclose his use of the
information before trading. 36 The Court refused to recognize
a general duty between participants in impersonal market
transactions to forego trading based on material nonpublic
information.33 Rejecting the parity of information rationale,
the Court emphasized that not every instance of financial un-
fairness constitutes a 10b-5 violation, reasoning that Chiarella
was a complete stranger who dealt with sellers through an
impersonal market. 13 Thus, a duty to disclose did not arise
from the mere possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion. 39 Chiarella established the requirement that some form
of a relationship exist between the parties of a securities trans-
action such as to give rise to a fiduciary duty to disclose or
abstain in order to impose liability.
40
132. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 225.
136. Id. at 231-33.
137. Id. at 233.
138. Id. at 232-33.
139. Id. at 233-35. But see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (seemingly
holding that anyone possessing inside information is subject to the disclose or
abstain rule).
140. The particular holding under Chiarella has been subsequently overruled by
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b. Hungary's Access to Information Approach
Under the Hungarian insider dealing restrictions,
Chiarella would have been convicted for insider dealing.
Chiarella would not fall within the scope of traditional corpo-
rate insiders under Hungarian dr United States law because
Chiarella was neither an executive officer of the issuer nor a
beneficial owner of more than ten percent of the issuer's equity
securities. Nevertheless, Chiarella would qualify as an insider
under Hungarian law pursuant either to his close working
contact with the target company' or to his access to inside
information and knowledge of its confidential nature.
4 2
Hungarian law broadens the scope of insiders to include
certain professional relationships. Specifically, the Hungarian
statute provides that insiders may be "those who within the
last six months have or had been employed or established any
kind of close working contact with the Issuer-independently
of whether they are natural or legal persons-in a capacity
giving them access to confidential inside information.' 4' Au-
ditors, legal advisors, and tax consultants are listed as exam-
ples. 44 Because this section requires the existence of some
sort of relationship, the' provision is roughly analogous to the
fiduciary duty approach, but expands the scope of liability by
not requiring that the relationship be one of trust and confi-
dence between the insider and the issuer. Chiarella's employ-
ment status does not subject him to liability because he was
not an employee of the target companies whose securities he
purchased. However, his professional relationship with the
issuer and his position in that relationship subject him to po-
tential liability. The question is whether the relationship be-
tween a financial printing company and its corporate custom-
ers establishes the kind of close working contact contemplated
by the statute, and whether the position of a financial printing
rule 14e-3 in the context of tender offers. However, the rule of Chiarella still ap-
plies to situations where no tender offers have been made. Thus, while Chiarella
would have been convicted under rule 14e-3, an analysis of the Chiarella case
remains helpful in distinguishing the American and Hungarian approaches in sce-
narios which do not involve tender offers.
141. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, $ 76(1)(d).
142. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, $ 76(2).
143. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, $ 76(1)(d).
144. Because the statute lists these as examples, presumably the list is not
exhaustive.
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employee allows that employee to gain access to confidential
inside information. Arguably, the requisite link is not estab-
lished because a corporate client does not share the same level
of trust with its financial printer as it does with auditors, legal
advisors, and tax consultants, all of whom routinely review
confidential documents. On the other hand, perhaps the re-
quired relationship is established because the position of a
financial printer routinely entrusted with concealed documents
is the type of working capacity the statute envisions.
The Chiarella case can be more easily resolved under Hun-
garian law by the access to information test. Another statutory
provision extends the scope of insiders to qualified insiders to
whom confidential information is handed, or persons who ob-
tained confidential information in any manner and who know-
ingly had access to confidential inside information.14 5 Be-
cause this section focuses on the relationship between the
insider and the inside information, it is roughly analogous to
the misappropriation theory, but the provision does not require
any wrongdoing on the part of the insider to impose liability.
Because Chiarella is not a qualified insider, only the second
part of the provision applies.
Chiarella would easily qualify as an insider under the
access to information test. First, the way in which a person
comes into possession of inside information is immaterial. The
fact that Chiarella obtained confidential inside information
about target companies of a tender offer by decoding the con-
cealed: names of companies contained in documents in the
course of his employment is not significant. Second, the person
must know that he or she has had access to confidential inside
information. The names of the target and offering companies
were concealed. The information was related to an unconsum-
mated tender offer, indicating that Chiarella, a financial print-
er customarily entrusted with confidential corporate docu-
ments, must have known of the confidential inside nature of
the information he used. Thus, Chiarella would have been
convicted under the Hungarian statute.
The Hungarian definition of insiders is broader in scope
than the United States definition under both the fiduciary duty
and misappropriation theories. Both the Hungarian statute
145. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, $ 76(2). See supra note 123.
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and American case law acknowledge that persons with a spe-
cial relationship with the issuer should be defined as insiders
and prohibited from trading on the basis of information ob-
tained by virtue of their relationship with the company. How-
ever, the Hungarian statute extends insider liability to those
without a fiduciary duty to the issuer who have knowingly had
access to confidential inside information. Thus, while United
States case law emphasizes a duty running between the par-
ties to the transaction, the Hungarian definition recognizes
that an unfair informational advantage is obtained whenever
inside information is knowingly used.
2. The State of Mind of Tippers v. the Likely Actions of
Tippees
a. Dirks's Tippers With a Motive and Derivative Tippees
Dirks v. SEC,'46 "through the same fiduciary duty ap-
proach used in Chiarella, restricted insider trading liability for
tippers and tippees. The Supreme Court reduced the potential
scope of insider trading liability for tippers by requiring a
personal benefit from tipping, and for tippees by requiring a
fiduciary breach on the part of the tipper.
Raymond Dirks was an investment analyst who received
information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity
Funding of America. 47 Secrist informed Dirks that the assets
of the company were overstated due to fraudulent corporate
practices and urged Dirks to verify the fraud and disclose it
publicly because previous complaints to regulatory agencies
had been ignored. 4 For a two-week period, Dirks openly in-
vestigated the allegations and discussed Secrist's charges, and
the price of stock correspondingly dropped.'49 While neither
Dirks nor his firm owned or traded any stock in Equity Fund-
ing, because Dirks openly discussed the information with cli-
ents and investors, a number of investors avoided tremendous
losses by selling their holdings. 5 ° In an administrative pro-
ceeding conducted by the Commission, Dirks was found to have
146. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
147. Id. at 648-49.
148. Id. at 649.
149. Id. at 649-50.
150. Id. at 649.
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violated section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, section
10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and rule 10b-
5.151
The first issue the Court confronted in Dirks was whether
a tippee who has knowingly received material nonpublic infor-
mation from an insider was subject to the same duties as an
insider, and therefore liable for tipping potential traders. The
Court reaffirmed the principle articulated in Chiarella that a
duty to disclose arises from the relationship between the trans-
acting parties and not merely from the ability to acquire infor-
mation based on a particular position in the market.5 2 The
Court sought to avoid the possible "inhibiting influence" on
market analysts that extending the duty to disclose or abstain
to persons who knowingly receive material nonpublic informa-
tion from an insider would have on a healthy market.'53
However, the Court did not eradicate all possibilities of tippee
liability. Instead, the Court declared that tippee liability was
derivative of an insider's breach of fiduciary duty.154 The test
for tippee liability entailed a consideration of two factors: (1)
whether the act of tipping constituted a breach of the tipper's
fiduciary duty; and (2) whether the tippee knew or should have
known such a breach had occurred.
155
The second issue the Court addressed was the question of
tipper liability, which had become a prerequisite'of tippee
liability. Here the Court noted that the question of whether
tipping constituted a breach of fiduciary duty largely depended
on the purpose of the disclosure.'56 The test for tipper liabili-
ty became whether the insider received a direct or indirect
personal benefit from the disclosure, such as pecuniary gain or
reputational benefit. 5 ' The Court held that because Secrist
was motivated only by a desire to expose fraud, he had com-
151. In the Matter of Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, 21
S.E.C. DocKET 1401 (Jan. 6, 1981). Because of Dirks's "important role in bringing
EFCA's [Equity Fund's] massive fraud to light," the SEC only censured him. Id. at
1412.
152. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-58.
153. Id. at 658.
154. Id. at 659.
155. Id. at 660-61.
156. Id. at 662.
157. Id. at 663.
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mitted no breach of duty; consequently, there had been no
derivative breach on the part of Dirks. 5 '
b. Hungary's Independent Tippers
Under the Hungarian statute, persons are liable for tip-
ping if they are insiders" 9 and if they divulge inside infor-
mation to a person likely to benefit from or pass on such kno-
wledge within the stock exchange. 6 Applying this test of tip-
per liability to the Dirks case, Secrist easily satisfies the "in-
sider" requirement. Secrist would be an insider within the
meaning of the Hungarian statute, either as an executive offi-
cer or as a person who had been employed by the issuer within
the last six months.
The "tipping" requirement is more difficult to apply be-
cause the standard is unclear. The first question is: what is the
threshold probability of "may be likely"? For example, does the
fact that Secrist disclosed the information to Dirks for purpos-
es of revealing the fraud possibly show that Dirks was not
likely to benefit from or pass on the information? On the other
hand, does the fact that Dirks was an investment analyst with
clients on the stock exchange indicate the possibility of benefit
or of future tipping on the part of the tippee? The second ques-
tion which emerges is: from whose point of view will the deter-
mination be made as to whether the tippee may be likely to
benefit or tip in the future? There is no requirement under the
Hungarian statute that the tipper know or have reason to
know that the tippee may be likely to benefit or to tip. Under
the Hungarian approach, Secrist's motivations in disclosing the
information to Dirks are irrelevant.' 6' The only issue is
whether Dirks may have been likely to benefit or tip. Thus, the
determination as to whether a tipper is liable depends entirely
15$. Id. at 667.
159. There are two broad categories of insiders: qualified insiders and persons
who have obtained confidential information in any manner and who have knowing-
ly had access to such information. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, 9
77(c).
160. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, 9 77(c).
161. The Hungarian statute provides that a tipper is liable for insider dealing
upon divulging inside information to whomever may be likely to benefit from such
knowledge or to pass on such knowledge within the Stock Exchange. The statute
is silent as to the requisite mental state of the tipper. 1990 Securities Act, supra
note 6, pt. VI, 9 77(c).
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on an after-the-fact judicial determination of the likelihood of a
benefit being received or a tip being disclosed by the tippee.
The main difference between the two approaches to tipper
liability is that, while the United States definition focuses on
the tipper's motivation behind making the tip, the Hungarian
definition concentrates on the likely actions of the tippee upon
receiving the tip. The Hungarian approach is arguably more
consonant with a concern for the integrity of the market and
parity in information.'62 While the United States' approach
appears to focus more on the state of mind of the tipper, the
Hungarian approach appears to focus more on the potential
harmful effects of the tip on the market. In fact, the Hungari-
an statute seems to have contemplated the very harm done to
the value of securities as a result of Dirks's disclosures. On the
other hand, disregarding the knowledge and motivation of the
tipper in making the tip ignores the level of culpability of the
tipper, and imposes a form of strict liability, the deterrence
value of which is questionable.
c. Hungarian Tippees With Informational Access
The Hungarian statute identifies two types of tippees. The
first category of tippees is comprised of qualified insiders to
whom confidential information is handed.'63 The second cate-
gory includes persons who obtain confidential information
regardless of the manner in which it was obtained and who
knowingly have access to confidential inside information.'64
Dirks does not fall within the first category of tippees because
he was not an executive of the issuer, a close relative of an
executive, a beneficial owner of the issuer, an employee of the
issuer, or a person with a close working contact with the issu-
er. Dirks would qualify as a tippee under the second category
because he obtained confidential information and knew that
the information was confidential.
Having classified Dirks as a tippee, the next issue under
the statute is to determine whether his disclosures represented
162. See infra text accompanying notes 163-66 (similarly arguing that tippee
liability in Hungary discards the mens rea emphasis found in United States case
law).
163. See supra note 123.
164. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, T 76(2).
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a prohibited form of insider activity. Because Dirks did not
deal himself or by proxy, he must have engaged in a prohibited
form of tipping in order to be subject to insider liability. 165
The fact that some of his clients avoided losses and that the
value of the corporation's securities decreased so dramatically
demonstrates that certain persons benefited from the disclo-
sure and passed on the information. Thus, presumably Dirks's
actions would pass the probability threshold required to im-
pose liability for tipping.
Tippee liability under Hungarian law is broader than the
approach by the Supreme Court in Dirks. Hungarian tippees
do not escape liability when the tipper has not breached a
fiduciary duty, because tippee liability in Hungary is indepen-
dent of tipper liability. A similarity between the approaches
lies in the scienter requirement. Both countries require that
the tippee know of the nature of the information received.
However, there is a subtle distinction between a tippee know-
ing that the tipper is breaching a duty and a tippee knowing
that he or she has access to inside information. Arguably, this
gap becomes negligible because knowledge of a tipper's breach
and knowledge of one's own access to information are triggered
by the confidential inside nature of the information itself. Still,
because the requisite knowledge by the tippee under Hungari-
an law is not limited by fiduciary duty concerns, tippee liabili-
ty in Hungary is more consistent with the goal of an honest
and open market.'66
3. Remote Tippees
a. American Remote Tippees
The disparity between the Hungarian and United States
approaches to insider trading liability becomes especially clear
upon examining the subject of remote tippees. The issue of
remote tippees is one of the more complicated problems in the
law of insider trading, because of the difficulty in distinguish-
ing market rumor from material nonpublic information, and
complete strangers transacting in an impersonal market from
165. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, 9 77. See also text accompany-
ing notes 159-60.
166. See supra part IV.C.2.b. (revealing the same theoretical consistency in the
statutory treatment of tipper liability).
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market participants transacting through a traceable chain of
derivative tipping.'
The scope of remote tippee liability in the United States
remains unclear for reasons of the unsettled nature of the law
on the subject and the special circumstances surrounding most
remote tippee cases. First, the Supreme Court has not explicit-
ly addressed the issue of remote tippees. Second, there is no
express statutory authorization for imposing insider trading
liability on tippees in general, much less indirect or remote
tippees."6 ' Third, the "silence" scenario in which the typical
remote tippee case arises makes it difficult to prove that the
defendant was aware of and traded on the basis of information
unknown to the marketplace and undisclosed by the defen-
dant. 6 9 Fourth, the typical impersonal market transaction
during which most remote tippee violations occur makes it
difficult to prove that market participants were defrauded and
would not have sold their stock had they known of the inside
information.'7
Notwithstanding the difficulties in assessing remote tippee
liability, American courts and commentators have crafted three
theories on which to predicate remote tippee liability. The first
theory treats the misappropriation theory as a cornerstone of
tippee liability.'7 ' The misappropriation theory contends that
"one who misappropriates nonpublic information in breach of a
fiduciary duty and trades on that information to his own ad-
vantage violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." 72 The strict
theory of tippee liability, by viewing the tippee as a possible
misappropriator, encompasses tippees who are directly privy to
material nonpublic information from an inside source and who
trade silently while in possession of that information. 73 This
restrictive approach limits the scope of remote tippee liability
167. Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Family Ties, Tippees and the
Chestman Decision: Time for a Principled Definition of Insider Trading, INSIGHTS,
July 1990, at 26.
168. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 167.
169. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 167.
170. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 167.
171. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 167.
172. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1053 (1985).
173. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 167.
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by requiring that the ultimate tippee be a direct recipient of
inside information from an insider. 74
The second theory imposes a fiduciary duty on the tippee
and creates a chain of persons with a duty to disclose.'75 This
theory more specifically requires that each person in the chain
receive the tip under the following circumstances: (1) expressly
for purposes of aiding in the trading of securities based on
inside information; (2) knowing that the information was mate-
rial and nonpublic; and (3) knowing or having reason to know
that the information arose as a result of some breach of duty
by an insider.'76 On the one hand, this moderate approach
expands the scope of remote tippee liability by not requiring
the penultimate tippee to be an insider. On the other hand,
this middle approach restricts the range of potential violators
by requiring that every participant in a chain of communica-
tion of inside information know of the prior tippee's breach of a
specific fiduciary duty and accept the information with an
understanding to keep the information confidential. 77 Thus,
while this theory encompasses a greater number of remote
tippees than the strict approach, the difficulty in establishing
the requisite state of mind for each tippee in a long chain of
derivative tipping makes the imposition of liability unlikely.
The third theory contends that a remote tippee who trades
on the basis of material nonpublic information violates rule
10b-5 only when the tippee knows that his or her source has
breached a fiduciary duty or has garnered an inappropriate
benefit. 7 8 This approach requires proof that: (1) the tipper
breached a fiduciary duty or received a personal benefit; (2) the
tippee knew that the information received was material and
nonpublic; and (3) the tippee knew that the information was
obtained via a fiduciary breach by an insider.179 By focusing
primarily on the state of mind of the ultimate tippee and treat-
ing the tippee as an after-the-fact participant in the fiduciary
174. See Zachary Joseph, A Comparative Analysis of the European Community
Insider Trading Directive, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 231, 244 (1990); ARNOLD S. JACOBS,
LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5, § 66.02[a][iii][C]&[F], at 3-494.23 (2d
ed. 1993); LANGEVOORT, supra note 60, at 123-30.
175. Joseph, supra note 174, at 246.
176. Joseph, supra note 174, at 246.
177. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 167.
178. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 167.
179. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 167.
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breach of the original source of the information, this broad
approach expands remote tippee liability beyond the scope
delineated by both the strict and moderate theories.
b. Chestman's Remote Tippees
United States v. Chestman8 0 was significant because it
marked the limits of remote tippee liability in the Second Cir-
cuit.' The Chestman Court' 2 reversed the 10b-5 convic-
tion of a stockbroker who traded for his own account and on
behalf of his customers based on inside information obtained
from his client, the husband of the niece of a majority share-
holder in a company about to be sold to a corporate buyer. 3
The Second Circuit set "rigorous standard[s] of proof in insider
trading cases involving remote, or indirect, tippees," "' by re-
quiring that the remote tippee know of the breach of a confi-
dential duty by the previous tippee and that each remote tip-
pee in the chain accept the duty to maintain confidentiali-
ty.
8 5
Robert Chestman was a stockbroker and financial advisor
180. 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d
Cir. 1991) (en banc).
181. Theodore A. Levine & Arthur F. Mathews, Remedies, Penny Stocks and
Market Reform, in SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 1991, at 451, 474 (PLI
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 741, 1991).
As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
issue of remote tippees. However, the Second Circuit is a "crucial forum in the
law of insider trading" for several reasons. First, a large number of insider trading
cases involve persons or entities located within New York City. Second, the SEC
and the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York
have established a particularly close working relationship over the past decade.
Third, the SEC has found the Second Circuit to be an hospitable venue for insider
trading actions. Pitt & Groskaufnanis, supra note 167.
182. There are two Chestman decisions. The Second Circuit first ruled on the
case in United States v. Cliestman on May 2, 1990. The Second Circuit reconsid-
ered the case on October 7, 1991. The "Chestman Court" refers to both panels and
their decisions. The "first panel" refers to the Second Circuit panel in United
States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), which consisted of Circuit Judges
Mahoney, Miner, and Carman; the "en banc panel" refers to the Second Circuit
panel in United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), which
consisted of Circuit Judges Kearse, Mahoney, McLaughlin, Miner, and Winter, and
Chief Judge Newman.
183. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 551.
184. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 167.
185. Levine & Mathews, supra note 181, at 474.
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
for the brokerage house of Gruntal & Co."8 6 Keith Loeb met
with Chestman in hopes of consolidating his and his wife's
holdings in Waldbaum, Inc. (Waldbaum). During their initial
meeting, Loeb indicated that his wife, Susan, was the grand-
daughter of Julia Waldbaum, a Waldbaum director, the wife of
the company's founder, and the niece of Ira Waldbaum, the
president and controlling shareholder of Waldbaum, whose
immediate family owned fifty-one percent of the outstanding
Waldbaum stock." 7
Ira Waldbaum entered into negotiations for the sale of
Waldbaum to the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc.
(A & P). The resulting stock purchase agreement required Ira,
as attorney-in-fact for the Waldbaum family stockholders, to
tender a controlling block of Waldbaum shares to A & P at a
price of fifty dollars a share.' Ira told various family mem-
bers, including his sister, Shirley Witkin, about the sale, of-
fered to tender their shares as well, and cautioned them that
the sale was confidential and should not be discussed. Never-
theless, Shirley told her daughter, Susan, about the sale and
cautioned her not to tell anyone except her husband, because
disclosure could ruin the sale. Susan informed her husband
about the pending tender offer and reiterated the same warn-
ing. ' 9 Loeb contacted Chestman, disclosed his "definite" and
"accurate" information that Waldbaum was about to be sold at
a "substantially higher" price than its market value, and asked
for his advice. 9 ° Chestman responded that he could not ad-
vise Loeb "in a situation like this."'9' Chestman subsequently
purchased 3,000 shares for his own account at $24.65 per
share, and 8,000 shares for his clients' accounts at prices rang-
ing between $25.75 and $26.00 per share, including 1,000
shares for the Loeb account.'92 Loeb recontacted Chestman
for advice, but Chestman restated that he could not advise
Loeb "in a situation like this," but that his research revealed
that Waldbaum was a "buy."'93 Loeb subsequently ordered
186. Chestman, 903 F.2d at 77.
187. Id.; 947 F.2d at 555.
188. 903 F.2d at 77; 947 F.2d at 555.
189. 903 F.2d at 77; 947 F.2d at 555.
190. 903 F.2d at 77; 947 F.2d at 555.
191. 903 F.2d at 77; 947 F.2d at 555.
192. 903 F.2d at 77; 947 F.2d at 555.
193. 947 F.2d at 555.
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1,000 shares of Waldbaum stock.'94 Finally, the tender offer
was publicly announced, and the stock correspondingly rose to
forty-nine dollars per share.9 '
The National Association of Securities Dealers and the
SEC commenced investigations into the Waldbaum transac-
tions. Loeb entered into a cooperation agreement with the
government. Chestman was indicted and convicted of ten
counts of fraud in violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, ten
counts of fraud in violation of section 14(e) and rule 14e-3, ten
counts of mail fraud, and one count of perjury.' 96
The Chestman Court affirmed the rule 14e-3 conviction,
but reversed the rule 10b-5, mail fraud, and perjury convic-
tions. 9 ' The 10b-5 convictions were based on the misappro-
priation theory, under the rationale that Chestman aided or
abetted the misappropriation by Loeb or that Chestman was a
tippee of the information misappropriated by Loeb. 98 In ad-
dressing the issue of 10b-5 liability, the court first distin-
guished between the traditional' 99 and misappropriation the-
ories of insider trader liability,"' and expressed concerns for
194. 903 F.2d at 77; 947 F.2d at 555.
195. 903 F.2d at 78; 947 F.2d at 555.
196. 903 F.2d at 78; 947 F.2d at 556.
197. On en banc reconsideration, the Second Circuit affirmed the rule 14e-3
conviction, reversed the rule 10b-5 and mail fraud convictions, and vacated the
previous panel's decision on all three issues. However, the court did not rehear the
appeal from the perjury conviction and thus, the panel's reversal of that conviction
stands. 947 F.2d at 554.
The Chestman treatment of the rule 14e-3, mail fraud, and perjury convic-
tions is not crucial to this analysis of remote tippee liability. See 903 F.2d at 80-
84; 947 F.2d at 556-64, 571 for the specific reasoning behind those decisions.
198. 947 F.2d at 564, 570.
199. The traditional theory claims that a duty to disclose or abstain arises ohly
from "'a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and bonfidence between [the]
parties to the transaction.'" 947 F.2d at 565 (quoting Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)). Under the traditional theory, tippee liability attaches in
two circumstances: (1) when an "'insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach;'" Id. (quoting Dirks v. Securities Ex-
change Commission, 463 U.S. at 660); and (2) "when the outsider obtains access to
confidential information solely for corporate purposes in the context of 'a special
confidential relationship.'" Id. Both circumstances of tippee liability are restricted
by two principles underlying the traditional theory of 10b-5 liability: (1) "the predi-
cate act of fraud must be traceable to a breach of duty to the purchasers or sell-
ers of securities;" and (2) "[the] fiduciary duty does not run to the purchasers or
sellers solely as a result of one's possession of material nonpublic information." Id.
These restrictions thwart liability in the case of most remote tippees.
200. The misappropriation theory asserts that "a person violates rule 10b-5
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the potentially unlimited scope of tippees encompassed by a
broad reading of the misappropriation theory.
The court, in observing that a fiduciary duty is not created
by "entrusting a person with confidential information "201 or
by "mere kinship, 2 °2 concluded that the "gratuitous reposal
of a secret to another who happens to be a family member" is
not, in itself, sufficient to establish the requisite fiduciary
relationship, or its functional equivalent. 2 3 The court rea-
soned that the essence of a "fiduciary or similar relationship of
trust and confidence" was the existence of confidence and de-
pendency on one side and superiority and influence on the
other.2 04 The court, in examining the requirement that there
exist a fiduciary breach by the misappropriator, determined
that Loeb's status as Susan's husband did not establish the
requisite fiduciary status and that Susan's gratuitous commu-
nication of confidential information to Loeb did not imply an
acceptance of a duty of confidentiality. Thus, absent a fiduciary
breach by Loeb, Chestman could not be derivatively liable as
Loeb's tippee or as his aider and abettor.
c. Hungarian Remote Tippees
The Hungarian approach to tippee liability would hold
remote tippees like Chestman liable for trading on the basis of
an inside tip. Under the Hungarian statute, remote tippees are
liable if they obtain and knowingly have access to confidential
information.2 5 Thus, Chestman would be liable merely be-
cause he possessed and knowingly had access to "definite" and
"accurate information that Waldbaum's could be sold at a 'sub-
when he misappropriates material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary
duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence and uses that information in a
securities transaction." 947 F.2d at 566. Because the misappropriation theory does
not require that the buyer or seller of securities be defrauded, the predicate act of
fraud may be perpetrated on a source of nonpublic information unaffiliated with
the buyer or seller of securities. Id. Additionally, because the misappropriation
theory does not require that the corporation expect the outsider to keep the dis-
closed nonpublic information confidential, the outsider may be clothed with tempo-
rary insider status upon any sort of fiduciary breach. Id. These expansive elements
enable the misappropriation theory to encompass a broad range of remote tippees.
201. 947 F.2d at 567.
202. Id. at 568.
203. Id
204. Id. 568-69.
205. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, $ 76(2).
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stantially higher' price than its market value."" 6 Because
such information is the type of information which remains
confidential until disclosure, Chestman would be liable howev-
er he obtained the information, and regardless of whether he
knew that Loeb was privy to inside information.
The Hungarian statutory definition encompasses more
remote tippees than each of the three American theories of
remote tippee liability."7 First, because the Hungarian defi-
nition does not require the penultimate tippee to be an insider,
Chestman would be deemed a violator regardless of whether
he obtained the inside information from Loeb, Susan, Shirley,
or Ira. The "attenuated passage of the information" from Ira to
Shirley to Susan to Loeb to Chestman does not attenuate
Chestman's liability in Hungary."8 Apparently, the Hungari-
ans were not concerned that extending remote tippee liability
beyond the confined sphere of shareholder relationships would
risk "taking over [the] 'whole corporate universe.' 209
Second, because the Hungarian statute does not require
knowledge of the confidentiality of the information or assump-
tion of the duty of confidentiality on the part of the tippee,
Chestman would be convicted as a remote tippee irrespective of
how Loeb obtained the tip from his wife. Under the Hungarian
approach, it would be irrelevant whether Loeb learned of the
tip upon gratuitous bestowal by his wife, as a result of Susan's
desire to advance her own interests, upon prompting by Loeb,
or following a pattern of sharing business confidences.
Third, the Hungarian approach is most analogous to the
broad theory of remote tippee liability in the United States,
because both approaches focus on the state of mind of the
ultimate tippee. However, the Hungarian statute requires a
different sort of knowledge on the part of the remote tippee.
Under the American approach, Chestman must know not only
that information regarding a pending tender offer is confiden-
tial, but that the information was obtained by a fiduciary
breach. In contrast, if Chestman were in Hungary, he need
206. 947 F.2d at 555.
207. See supra part IV.C.3.a.
208. 903 F.2d at 79.
209. 947 F.2d at 567 (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1377
(2d Cir. 1978) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430
U.S. 467, 480 (1977)).
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only know that he himself was privy to confidential informa-
tion. This informational access was arguably established as far
back as his initial encounter with Loeb, when Loeb revealed
his family connections. Thus, while all three American ap-
proaches are restricted by some form of fiduciary requirement,
the Hungarian approach generates more expansive liability by
focusing on each individual's access to information.
d. Interpreting the Meaning of Inside Information
In comparing different insider trading laws, defining what
sort of information raises confidentiality concerns is as signifi-
cant as delineating the scope of insiders prohibited from using
or disclosing that information. Briefly, the Hungarian statute
defines inside information as "confidential insider informa-
tion."21 ° American courts have similarly defined inside infor-
mation as "material nonpublic information." Both definitions
require that the information be valuable in some way, and not
be publicly known. While the definitions initially appear to be
similar, there are some subtle differences, especially in their
treatment of materiality.
i) Materiality v. Substantial Effect on the Value
The primary difference between the two countries' defini-
tions of inside information lies in their evaluations of material-
ity. In the United States, the materiality standard for inside
information requires "a substantial likelihood that the disclo-
sure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reason-
able investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available."2 ' Furthermore, when the infor-
mation concerns a contingent or speculative event, materiality
"will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the
indicated probability that the event will occur and the antici-
pated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the
210. Act VI 1990 on Issuing and Public Broking of Certain Securities and on
Stock Exchange, I No. 8 Hungarian Rules of Law in Force, at pt. VI, 9 75. See
supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
211. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (expressly adopting in
the context of insider trading the materiality standard as previously enunciated in
TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), which defined materi-
ality in the proxy solicitation context). See supra text accompanying notes 77-80;
see also supra note 77.
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company activity."212
The Hungarian approach looks to whether the publication
of the confidential inside information "may effect substantially
the value of Securities."213 The statute regards as material
"information relating to the financial, economic and legal situa-
tions of the Issuer, Broker and Warrantor." The statute also
lists as examples "new issues, major deals, structural changes,
turn-round projects and winding up."214
The two approaches differ with respect to the threshold of
probability, character of proof, and timing of judicial review.
The probability threshold under the Hungarian statute ap-
pears to be lower than that required under United States case
law. The Hungarian statute only requires the mere possibility
that the information will change the value of securities. The
American definition requires a substantial possibility that the
information will change the character of information available.
The two approaches also differ in terms of what changes
are required to prove the materiality of the information in
question. While the Hungarian approach looks for a change in
the value of securities, the American approach emphasizes a
change in the total mix of information available. Arguably,
Hungary's emphasis on the real effect of the information on
the market is in line with its official recognition of the relation
between informational access and market efficiency. Similarly,
the United States' emphasis on the availability of information
is arguably consistent with its policy favoring disclosure as the
primary regulatory mechanism in the context of public trading
of securities.
Finally, the primary difference between the two standards
of materiality is the time at which the value of information is
determined. The Hungarian approach looks to the probability
that the information will have a substantial effect on the value
of the securities. This evaluation is made from the standpoint
of a judge in Budapest presumably after the trading has oc-
curred and after the disclosure or nondisclosure of information
has already been shown to have had an impact on the price of
the stocks concerned. In contrast, an American judge views the
212. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
213. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, 9 75(2).
214. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, 9 75(2).
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information from the point of view of the "reasonable investor"
at the time of the trade. Arguably, the type of information
which would be relevant to a reasonable investor is likely to be
the type of information which would have an impact on the
value of the security. However, at the moment of trading, the
American investor may still be in a better position to judge the
materiality of inside information, and thus whether such trad-
ing is prohibited.
ii) Confidential v. Nonpublic
Another component of the definition of inside information
is its nonpublic or confidential nature. While the notion of
confidentiality conjures up trust relationships and fiduciary
duties, the nonpublic nature of the information merely signifies
its informational status in the marketplace. Ironically, while
American common law emphasizes fiduciary duty, Hungarian
law emphasizes informational parity. Because the connotations
appear to be reversed, the differences between confidential and
nonpublic are primarily semantic.
e. Implementing Effective Enforcement
i) Criminal Liability
Both Hungary and the United States subject insider trad-
ing violators to criminal liability. Insider traders in Hungary
and the United States face possible criminal fines and impris-
onment. In Hungary, the Public Prosecutor, aided by the Su-
pervisory Board of Securities, the Hungarian rendition of the
SEC, may bring criminal charges against insider dealing viola-
tors. In the United States, the Justice Department, with the
investigative and legal assistance of the Securities Exchange
Commission, may charge insiders with criminal liability for
violations of the federal securities regulations.
Although both countries impose criminal liability for insid-
er trading violations and although the Supervisory Board of
Securities enjoys the same nominal powers as the SEC, the
enforcement of the securities regulations has been more vigor-
ous and more effective in the United States for several reasons.
First, the number of cases prosecuted and convicted in the
United States far exceeds the absence of actions brought
against insiders by the Hungarian government. Second, the
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publicity surrounding the insider trading scandals of the 1980s
has increased public awareness of the risks of insider trading,
and arguably the deterrent value of the securities regulations
as well. Third, the long existence of and the generous grants of
authority by Congress to the SEC have created a legion of
experienced securities regulators and strengthened the
Commission's administrative and investigative power to better
implement and enforce the vague prohibitions of Congressional
legislation. Thus, despite the formal similarities, there are real
differences in the effectiveness of the enforcement in the two
countries.
ii) Civil Liability
Another major difference between Hungarian and Ameri-
can insider trading law is the absence of civil liability for insid-
er trading in Hungary. Conversely, individuals in the United
States have an implied private cause of action in cases where
they are victimized by insider trading. This private right of
action is complicated by differing judicial standards of the
fiduciary elements of materiality, reliance, causation, and sci-
enter.215 Proponents of a private right of action argue that
victims of insider trading deserve compensation, that the addi-
tional threat of civil liability provides a necessary and effective
deterrent, and that civil liability avoids the stricter burdens of
criminal proof. Arguments against a private cause of action
point primarily to the judicial impropriety that has led to this
implied remedy. Although the deterrence value of civil liability
would improve the effective enforcement of the securities regu-
lations in Hungary, it is highly unlikely that courts in a civil
code system like Hungary's would have the wide discretion
necessary to create derivative private rights of action. Penal-
ties for violations of the law must be explicitly established by
the Civil Code.
iii) Short-Swing Liability
The major difference between the Hungarian and United
States approaches to short-swing trading is the strict liability
imposed in the United States on traditional corporate insiders
215. RIDER & FFRENCH, supra note 53, at 9-24.
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engaged in short-swing trading.216 In contrast, the Hungari-
an statutory provision dealing with short-swing transactions
explicitly provides three loopholes:217 (1) proof that confiden-
tial information was not available;218 (2) proof that the securi-
ty had to be sold as liquidator to pay creditors;219 or, (3) proof
that the transaction was concluded with a contemporaneous
insider.22' Additionally, while Hungary has limited the re-
strictions to securities transactions conducted to and from the
same person and completed within a period of three
months,22 ' the United States imposes short-swing liability
regardless of the status of the other party and for a longer
period of six months.222 The policy behind the Hungarian
limitations to short-swing liability is unclear. Perhaps this
reluctance to impose strict liability on short-swing traders
reflects a deeper fear that excessive regulation will stifle trad-
ing activity. After all, short-swing trading may encompass the
majority of trading activity on the Stock Exchange, and despite
the official policy against insider trading, Hungarians may be
216. The Commission was given specific rulemaking authority to exempt trans-
actions that are not comprehended within the purpose of section 16(b). For exam-
ple, an extremely narrow exception to the objective standard of section 16(b) exists
when a transaction is "unorthodox" or "borderline." In such circumstances, courts
are instructed to adopt a "'pragmatic approach in imposing Section 16(b) liability
which considers the opportunity for speculative abuse, i.e., whether the statutory
'insider' had or was likely to have access to inside information."' However, courts
have varied in their application of the exemption and situations to which the
exemption applies remains unclear. Edward J. Yodowitz, Avoiding Liabilities Under
the Securities Law: Preventive Maintenance, Corporate Compliance, 443 (PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 657 1992) PLI ORDER NO. H4-
5138 Lit 657 (Securities Litigation 1992: Strategies and Current Developments)
(1992).
217. The three loopholes are more precisely one rebuttal mechanism, which
shifts the presumption, and two exceptions, which preclude liability completely.
The statute provides that "qualified insiders," who within three months resell to or
repurchase from the same person from which or to which the security was origi-
nally purchased or sold, are presumed to have engaged in a prohibited form of
insider dealing. However, this presumption is rebutted by proof that confidential
information was not available. Furthermore, liability is not imposed when the sale
of the security was necessary to provide a "liquidator" for creditors and when the
transaction was conducted with a person who had the same inside knowledge
available. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, 99 78, 79.
218. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, 9 78.
219. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, T 79(a).
220. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, T 79(b).
221. 1990 Securities Act, supra note 6, pt. VI, 9 78.
222. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988).
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more concerned with the existence of trading than the problem
of insider trading.2
2 3
V. OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A comparative analysis of the insider trading laws in Hun-
gary and the United States reveals that the statutory liability
of insiders in Hungary is broader than insider liability in the
United States. The broad liability in Hungary may be a func-
tion of one or more of the following reasons: First, statutory
definitions are necessarily more general than judicial interpre-
tations which emerge from specific analyses of different factual
scenarios. Second, Hungarian liability is not confined by the
constraints of American common law fiduciary concerns. Third,
the Hungarian securities regulations were quickly and errati-
cally conceived in a vacuum by inexperienced legal analysts.
Fourth, the Hungarian Parliament was truly guided by its
official policy in favor of informational equality and market
integrity. Fifth, the Hungarian Parliament was really motivat-
ed by the desire to conform its economic reforms to the defini-
tions adopted by other European entities. This section will
explore the foundations for the broader insider liability of the
Hungarian statute.
The broader scope of Hungarian insider liability may par-
tially result from the lawmaking mechanism characteristic of
civil code legal systems. The process of statutory lawmaking is
difficult and obscure. Defining complex activity by statute
requires legislators to define the prohibited activity in general
terms rather than risk underinclusiveness. The absence of a
statutory definition of insider trading in the United States may
have produced a narrower scope of liability in the United
States. The differences in the scope of insider liability reflected
in the Hungarian statute and American case law may reflect
deeper differences between lawmaking under civil code sys-
tems and common law jurisdictions, especially in light of the
closer connection between insider trading laws in Hungary and
other European civil code countries.
223. Tibor Papp, a spokesperson for the Budapest Exchange's Securities Trad-
ing Committee, stated, "[w]e have a small market and with insider trading, at
least it's trading. If we put too many rules, it will kill the market." Hamilton,
supra note 11, at 1.
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Hungarian insider liability may be broader than liability
in the United States because the scope of Hungarian statutory
liability is not restricted by American common law notions of
fraud and fiduciary duty. The Hungarian definitions of insid-
ers, tippers, and tippees encompass more insiders than the
American definitions, not only because of the differences in the
definitions themselves, but also because of the American re-
quirement that a fiduciary relationship connect parties to a
securities transaction. The scope of insiders is broader under
Hungarian law because the Hungarian definition includes
persons in any kind of close working contact with the issuer
giving them access to confidential inside information, and
persons who obtain confidential information in any kind of
manner and who knowingly have access to confidential inside
information. In contrast, the American definition requires that
the professional or misappropriator be connected through some
form of a fiduciary relationship involving trust or confidence.
Thus, because Hungarian law focuses on the informational
status of the insider itself while American law concentrates on
the connection between the transacting parties, the Hungarian
statute remains the broader of the two approaches.
The expansive nature of the Hungarian insider liability
may not have been intended. Hungary is in a state of great
economic flux, and its legal reforms have been criticized as
overambitious, misguided, and sporadic. Discussions with SEC
consultants to Hungary suggest that the securities regulations
were drafted through hasty deliberations by inexperienced
policymakers whose primary goal was to complete the Act
quickly before the formal reopening of the Budapest Stock
Exchange. Present efforts to amend the laws, with the help of
securities institutions from all over the world, also indicate
ambiguities surrounding the wisdom of the current legislation.
On the other hand, the broad reach of the Hungarian law
may have been specifically contemplated by the Hungarian
Parliament in keeping with the official policy to foster capital
flow, to promote securities markets, and to safeguard inves-
tors. Perhaps the Hungarian Government did adopt the ratio-
nale that insider trading is economically inefficient and ethi-
cally unfair. However, the fast pace of Hungary's economic
transformation and the sporadic nature of its legal reforms
suggest that the enactment of the securities regulations was
not the result of arduous policymaking.
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The expansive character of insider liability in Hungary
appears to have been a deliberate effort to gain international
recognition by conforming to the growing international consen-
sus in favor of prohibiting insider trading. The fact that many
of the economic reforms have been "radically conceived" but
"modestly implemented" suggests that Hungary endeavored to
actualize the regulations on paper for appearance purposes,
rather than to embrace an economic policy in reality for genu-
224ine purposes.
In light of the ambiguous policy underlying its present
regulatory scheme, Hungary should reevaluate the assump-
tions and merits behind its insider dealing restriction. More-
over, because effective implementation is crucial to the success
of any regulatory scheme, Hungary should enact reasonable
regulations based on its own policy determinations, and imple-
ment effective mechanisms in line with those policies. In fact,
Hungary is currently in the process of amending its securities
regulations with help from central securities institutions from
all over the world. Moreover, Hungary is presently an associate
member of the European Community and presumably seeks to
become a full member in the future. Thus, regardless of the
true intentions behind the present reforms, Hungary will need
to critically reassess its economic objectives to ensure the fu-
ture success of its new reforms.
It is unclear whether the current state of Hungary's insid-
er trading regulations is the circumstantial result of Hungary's
civil code lawmaking process and piecemeal economic transfor-
mation, or the intentional product of a deliberate governmental
effort to promote informational equality, pursuant to its own
policies, or to enhance the market's international reputation,
pursuant to foreign concerns. If the effects of the regulations
are the product of external legal and economic circumstances,
then Hungary needs to realign its official policies with the
market realities of the Budapest Stock Exchange. However, if
Hungary is truly concerned with the inefficiency and unfair-
ness risked by insider trading, then the broad scope of its regu-
lations must be actively implemented by effective enforcement
mechanisms. On the other hand, if Hungary is primarily moti-
vated by a desire to attract foreign investment and gain inter-
224. Clarke, supra note 13, at 14.
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national confidence, then upon seeking membership to the
European Community it will need to conform its laws to the
standards set by that entity.225
Regardless of its true intentions, Hungary should still
critically reassess the value of its current regulations as well
as the merits of its future economic, policies. Although the
American model has been recognized as the most developed
securities regulatory framework in the world, Hungary should
not assume that all aspects of the United States scheme are
effective or appropriate to its unique form of market economy.
For example, the strict and unforgiving liability under section
16(b) may chill the majority of trading activity on the Budapest
Stock Exchange. In addition, the narrowing effect on liability
by the American fiduciary relationship requirement might
become too restrictive in a civil code system and might allow
too many traders to escape liability. Finally, a more flexible
analysis may be especially dangerous in an underdeveloped
securities market, where insider trading is common, invest-
ment is risky, domestic investors are inexperienced, and for-
eign investors are wary. A broad policy encouraging informa-
tional equality and market integrity may be particularly cru-
cial to the success of an emerging securities market, which
needs confident investors and foreign investment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Hungary's economic transformation from a command to
a market economy, Hungarians must overcome economic ineffi-
ciencies, legal inconsistencies, and psychological ambiguities.
In a rapid series of sporadic reforms between 1968 to the pres-
ent, the Hungarian government has struggled to establish a
new economy by mixing socialism and capitalism. Although
many have criticized the past reforms for being quickly con-
225. A comparative analysis between Hungarian securities regulations and the
European Community directive is beyond the scope of this paper. Although there
is no text available specifically contrasting the securities regulations of these two
entities, many articles have examined the Community's directives by comparing
them to other European countries. See, e.g., Raffaello Fornasier, The Directive on
Insider Dealing, 13 FORDHAMt INT'L L.J. 149 (1989-1990); Salbu, supra note 66;
Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Regulation of Insider Trading in the European
Community, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1037 (1991); Diamond, supra note 53; Amy
E. Stutz, A New Look at the European Economic Community Insider Trading Di-
rective, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 231 (1990); Langevoort, supra note 1.
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ceived and inadequately implemented, Hungary has been a
leader in most areas of economic reform in Central and East-
ern Europe, and appears to have adopted a more sophisticated
approach for the future. While the dearth of promising busi-
nesses and confident investors makes investment in the Buda-
pest Stock Exchange appear risky, accelerated privatization
programs, attractive investment incentives, and new securities
regulations promise a brighter economic future.
Given the growing international concern for insider trad-
ing and the progressive economic developments in Hungary, a
comparison between the insider trading laws in the United
States and Hungary is both economically and legally educa-
tional. Hungary appears to have enacted an insider trading
ban in deference to a growing international consensus, rather
than in acceptance of the view that insider trading encourages
market inefficiency and informational inequality. Regardless of
Hungary's true intentions, the clarity and predictability of the
statutory definition are particularly crucial to the successful
development of the immature Hungarian securities market.
Insider trading liability is broader in Hungary, primarily
because the statutory definitions are not confined by the con-
straints of the American fiduciary emphasis. While the Hun-
garian definition of insiders focuses on the insider's access to
information, the American definition requires a fiduciary duty
between the parties to the transaction. Because the Hungarian
definition of tippers does not require a personal benefit, but
rather focuses on the effect of the tip on the market, tipper
liability in Hungary is broader than in the United States. Sim-
ilarly, tippee liability in Hungary is more encompassing than
in the United States, because Hungarian tippees need not
know of a fiduciary breach by the tipper, but need only know of
their own access to information. Finally, because remote tippee
liability under Hungarian law cannot be avoided by breaking a
chain of derivative tippees, the Hungarian approach generates
more expansive liability by focusing on the remote tippee's
access to information alone. In sum, while the American ap-
proach narrows the scope of insiders, tippers, and tippees by
predicating liability upon the existence of a fiduciary duty, the
Hungarian approach encompasses more potential violators by
focusing on the informational access of the alleged violator.
Thus, the Hungarian approach is more consistent with market
efficiency and informational parity rationales.
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Another difference between the two approaches is the
differing definitions of inside information. The Hungarian
standard for materiality is lower in threshold probability, more
objective in its proof of materiality, and more arbitrary in its
assessment by a judge. Thus, an American investor may be on
better notice to determine whether to disclose or abstain from
trading.
A final difference between the regulatory schemes in Hun-
gary and the United States lies in the effectiveness of their
enforcement. Although the criminal liability in both countries
is nominally similar, the administrative discretion and investi-
gative powers of the SEC have resulted in much better enforce-
ment of insider trading in the United States. While the deter-
rence value of imposing civil liability in Hungary cannot be
questioned, the possibility of creating such an implied remedy
in a civil code jurisdiction is virtually nonexistent. Finally,
despite the benefits of strict liability in short-swing trading,
the loopholes under the Hungarian approach may be necessary
to avoid eradicating the limited market activity.
Hungary should be praised for its ambitious economic and
legal reforms. Despite the market risks and regulatory uncer-
tainties associated with the Budapest Stock Exchange, the
securities regulations remain untested, and it will take time
for these markets to mature and benefit from the new econom-
ic policies. From a Western standpoint, progress is slow and
obstacles abundant, but Hungary should be careful to follow its
own pace. Thus, in its outlook to the future, Hungary must
closely examine its own policies before integrating itself into
the international community.
Meeka Jun
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